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Abstract 
The following account of Greece’s sovereign debt crisis starts in 2010, when the Greek 
government formalized the unreliability of its accounting methods and the deal with the 
Goldman Sachs came to light. This revealed a hole in the budget of more than 15% of GDP 
and a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 129,7%, a value well above the previously reported 113%. 
As a result, serious doubts arose on the country's ability to finance its debt, triggering a deep 
confidence’s crisis, which not only undermined Greece’s financial and economic situation, 
but also jeopardized the stability and credibility of the projects “European Monetary Union” 
and “Euro”. 
Therefore, faced with Greece's inability to finance itself on international financial markets, in 
May 2010, the IMF in coordination with the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank, agreed on a twin track course of actions with the Greek government. The former, in 
order to enable Greece to make interest payments and roll over its debt, would have provided 
financial assistance to the latter, which, in turn, would have had to adopt a series of austerity 
measures aimed at achieving substantial fiscal consolidation. 
However, has this strategy worked out? Clearly, it depends on the targets. Troika's cure was 
successful in determining a transferring of "Greece-risk" from the European banking system 
to the Euro zone governments, while it completely failed in achieving the aim of 
consolidating Greece’s public finances and putting its sovereign debt back on a sustainable 
path. Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio passed from 127,9% in 2009 to 148,3% in just one year, and 
finally it ended up to 177% in 2015, despite a major restructuring in 2012 led to a debt write-
off of about €110 billion. 
This disaster is due to the drastic fall in Greece’s GDP, which shrank by 25% in five years, 
causing a reduction in the tax base, and to the reluctance of the Greek government to 
implement the reform program imposed by international creditors. 
The reduction of the tax base has, in turn, led the country to increasingly rely on debt to 
finance itself leaving Greece totally vulnerable to shifts in investors’ confidence. 
It all has had a severe impact on the country’s banking system, which increasingly dependent 
on the extraordinary liquidity provided by the ECB, has experienced a deep liquidity crisis 
that was likely to turn into a solvency crisis. However, Cyprus’ experience and the most 
recent Greece’s experience highlight how the introduction of capital controls can efficiently 
avoid that risk. 
Thus, in this framework, three are the alternatives that lie ahead for Greece and its creditors.  
 
The first would require Greece to adopt a series of measures aimed at realizing a thorough 
reorganization of the country, so that a new Greek economy would be able to emerge. 
The second alternative is that of a debt restructuring. Greece’s sovereign debt should be 
reduced by at least 60%, down to 120% of GDP, in order to be considered sustainable. A debt 
restructuring would reduce Greece’s overall debt burden and allow the country to have a 
greater room to implement reforms to restore competitiveness and growth. 
Finally, the last alternative would be that of Grexit, or in other words, Greece’s exit from the 
European Monetary Union. 
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Introduction 
In the early years of the 21st century, Greece’s growth path was similar to that recorded in the 
other Euro area countries, and sometimes even above the EMU-average. Indeed, between 
2000 and 2007, its real GDP has grown at 4,13% a year on average, peaking at 5,9% 
in 2003 and 5,5% in 2006. Moreover, its sovereign debt rating was among the highest, even if 
the country's debt was increasing, passing from €96 billion in 2000 (about 103.4 % of GDP) 
to €240 billion in 2007 (around 107.4% of GDP). Thus, banks, governments and other private 
funds kept granting loans to Greece at low interest rates. But then what has caused a shift in 
the Greek situation? The 2008 financial crisis. Or more precisely, the 2008 financial crisis has 
highlighted the country’s serious problems that until then had remained hidden. First of all, 
Greece has suffered badly from the crisis because its economy is mainly based on tourism and  
export sector. In addition, the 2000-2007 economic growth was not the result of an increase in 
the competitiveness of the Greek products, but rather that of an increased ease in access to 
credit due to the country’s participation in the EMU. Moreover, during this seven-year period, 
both propensity to private consumption and public expenditure rose; and as a result, Greece’s 
primary surplus quickly turned into a significant primary deficit, above the 3% ceiling 
envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty. The latter, indeed, establishes that no Euro zone member 
may have a debt higher than 60% of its GDP or a budget deficit greater than 3% of its GDP. 
But, despite Greece’s lack of compliance with debt and deficit criteria, the country has been 
able to join the European Monetary Union and meet Euro zone limits on government 
borrowing by masking its real debt and deficit through the employment of different creative 
accounting methods.  
The Greek government’s use of those accounting tricks remained unknown until 2004, when 
the latter admitted, for the first time, to have manipulated balance sheet data to join the Euro; 
indeed, since 1999, its deficit-to-GDP ratio has never been lower than 3%. Not only. In 2010, 
the new Prime Minister, George Papandreou announced that finances had been further rigged 
by the previous government and that the 2009 deficit-to-GDP ratio would have equaled 12%. 
Actually, at the time of the final revision performed by Eurostat, it ended at 15,7% of GDP. 
Moreover, it was revealed that, since 2001, Greece paid millions of dollars to Goldman Sachs 
and other investment banks that helped the former to mask its high debt and deficit level. 
Investors’ trust in Greek statistics, never solid, completely eroded. Two of three main credit-
rating agencies, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s, responded by downgrading the Greek 
government debt to junk status, below the investment grade; while the price of five-year 
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Greek sovereign CDSs jumped above 1000 basis points. This marked the beginning of the 
“final collapse”. Indeed, the loss of investors’ confidence limited Greece’s capacity to finance 
itself fully on international financial markets; and the country’s condition was further 
aggravated by the high tax evasion, which, according to the IMF, costs the government 
between €10 and €20 billion annually in tax revenues. 
Therefore, in this framework, in May 2010, the Eurogroup Ministers concurred with the 
European Commission, the ECB and the IMF that market access for Greece was not sufficient 
and that providing a loan was warrant to safeguard the stability in the Euro area as whole. 
The provision of financial assistance to Greece occurred initially in the form of bilateral loans, 
subsequently replaced by more sophisticated instruments, like the European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), while 
the culmination of this “process of Greece’s public debt management” is represented by the 
establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). However, this supply was and is 
linked to a strict conditionality principle, defined in the Memorandum of Understanding that 
the Hellenic Republic negotiated with the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. 
Indeed, the loans provision was conditional on the implementation by the Greek government 
of severe structural reforms aiming at restoring investors’ confidence, stabilizing the fiscal 
and the economic situation and addressing the fiscal and structural challenges of the economy.  
The line adopted by the EU and the IMF allowed to greatly reduce the risk that a Greek 
default would have triggered a wave of losses across the Euro zone as well as the impact that 
the latter would have had on the European banking system (after the launch of the third 
bailout package, Greece’s banking system holds only 4% of the country’s total debt, while 
foreign banks hold only 1% of the latter). It also allowed Greece to record a primary surplus 
of €2,27 billion in 2015. But nonetheless, the country’s economic and financial situation 
remained precarious. Between 2010 and 2015, Greece’s GDP fell by 25%, while its debt-to-
GDP ratio increased by about 21%, reaching an all-time high value of 177% of GDP in 2015. 
In addition, in June 2015, the Greek banking sector, whose survival was only guaranteed by 
the emergency liquidity (ELA, Emergency Liquidity Assistance) provided by the ECB, 
experienced a severe liquidity crisis that ultimately led to a three-week bank holiday and the 
imposition of controls on capital movements (which are still in place). 
The three-week bank holiday and the capital controls negatively affected Greece’s small and 
medium enterprises, and some of them were even forced to shut down. Consequently, in the 
third quarter of 2015, Greece’s GDP contracted 0,5%, its economy shrank by 2,3% and the 
number of non-performing loans in the Hellenic banks’ balance sheets increased, passing 
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from 30% of banks’ total claims in June 2015 to 40% in September 2015. This made it 
necessary implementing a banks recapitalization process aimed at covering the €14,4 billion 
Greek credit institutions’ capital shortfall. 
In the crisis framework, the ECB intervened by adopting a series of both conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy instruments that, along with a substantial reduction in the 
interest rates to a record level of 0,05%, helped to tackle the liquidity crisis that was hitting 
the Greek banks and prevent the increase in Greek government bond yields up to unstainable 
levels. 
But despite this, much more needs to be done. 
In 2016, Greece’s sovereign debt is far from the level that would ensure its sustainability over 
the medium and long term; and, since international lenders refuse to allow for a write-off of 
the sovereign debt, it follows that if the country wants to achieve a sustainable debt reduction, 
and therefore avoid the risk of default, it will have to provide the right stimulus for growth. 
This would require Greece and its creditors to focus on the implementation of a reforms’ 
program which adequately weights the need to achieve substantial fiscal consolidation, the 
desire to prevent injustice and the necessity to restore economic growth. Greece’s economic 
recovery should start from the country’s strongest sector, tourism and exports, whose 
contribution, in 2015 alone, has accounted for 30% of its GDP. 
However, this is not the only alternative that lies ahead for Greece, since the country could 
always implement Grexit. But, in such a case, the effects that Greece’s withdrawal from the 
Euro area would have on banking, financial and economic sector will be devastating; 
moreover, in case of  Grexit, also the credibility of the project “European Monetary Union” 
and “Euro” would be seriously undermined. 
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CHAPTER 1
  A LOOK TO GREECE 
 
1.1 An unsustainable growth 
Before the global crisis, during the period 2000 to 2007, Greece has recorded high growth 
rates (over those years, its real GDP has grown at 4,13% a year on average), mainly driven by 
an increase in foreign capital inflows and the expectation of a low degree of risk in capital 
investments, as a consequence of the entry into the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
[EUROSTAT (2015)] 
Nevertheless, starting in 2009, the Greek economy has experienced a deep recession (after 
2009, Greece has recorded negative average growth rate of -4,45%) from which it is 
struggling to emerge. [EUROSTAT (2015)] The 2008 financial crisis weakened the country’s 
strong sectors, tourism and export, which are particularly exposed to short term economic 
changes and have suffered a drop in profits of over 15% in 2009 alone. [GUERRARA, A. 
(2012)] Moreover, between 2010 and 2015, the level of both public and private investments 
drastically declined as well as that of consumption. This caused a dramatic fall in GDP, that 
over the same years, has dropped by almost 25%, reducing the tax base and increasing the 
state’s reliance on official support of loans to fund social payments, payroll expenses and the 
fiscal deficit. As a result, the public sector debt increased substantially, passing from 129,7% 
of GDP in 2009 to 177% in 2015.  
In this framework, strict austerity measures aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit and restoring 
market confidence in the future of the economy were adopted as part of the conditions of 
financial support packages from the EU and the IMF. However, despite the fact that Greece’s 
public budget adjustment has been larger than those of Spain, Portugal and Ireland, its 
economy did not recover like the others. Why? Contrary to what has been observed in the 
case of Spain, Portugal and Ireland, the Greek crisis had a financial, economic, fiscal, political 
and social origin. In one word: structural. 
Greece’s 2000-2007 economic growth was not “driven” by economic fundamentals, and 
therefore it was unsustainable; between 2000 and 2007, the total factor productivity, which 
can be considered as the engine of growth, remained unchanged at 2.5%, while labor 
productivity dropped by approximately 8%. [MANUNEAS, T., KETTINI, E. (2012)] This 
resulted in a huge loss of competitiveness of the Greek economy with respect to the other 
Euro zone countries; and this gap widened during the years of recession.  
The relative loss of competitiveness, affecting exports, constrained, in turn, the country’s 
economic recovery; indeed, although from 2013 onwards, Greece has recorded current 
account surpluses, thanks to a reduction of imports (mainly due to contraction of the internal 
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demand) and an increase in exports, it is worth noting that the latter has increased less than it 
would have been necessary to cushion, at least partially, the “tightening” of the domestic 
demand. In addition, as Figure 1 shows, in Greece, exports of goods and services increased 
much less than those of other European countries that, like the first, have pursued economic 
adjustment programmes. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014)] 
 
                    Fig.1:  Exports of goods and services 
                  Source: European Commission (2014) 
Moreover, government corruption at various levels, protection of special interests, waste of 
public money, the presence of weak and unsuitable strategic infrastructures, a welfare state 
torn by decades of internal conflicts and endless deep inequalities, as well as the slowness in 
the implementation of reforms represent additional obstacles that have prevented the Hellenic 
Republic from recording successes like those achieved by other countries, that as Greece 
benefited from the support of the Troika. The latter is an informal control body established in 
2008 to tackle the financial and economic emergency in Greece (however, financial assistance 
was also subsequently provided to Portugal, Cyprus, Ireland and Spain). It is constituted by 
representatives of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, and responsible for rescue plans of the countries, within the 
Euro area, whose public debt is in crisis. Its objective is averting the risk of sovereign default, 
by granting cheap loans to all those Member States which are in difficulty. 
However, despite these obvious difficulties, small steps forward have been taken. In 2015, 
Greece has recorded a primary surplus of €2,27 billion. Indeed, while, between 2010 and 
2015, public expenditures have been cut from 50% to 45% of GDP, government revenues 
have increased, passing from 37% to 45% of GDP, thanks to an increase in the taxation. The 
wages have decreased by 22% and the fall in the demand due to the consolidation of the 
public deficit and remunerations has led to a reduction of imports, and thus the external 
deficit. But, the “equilibrium” reached is precarious. Without further reforms, if Greece 
changed the economic policy, in other words if the public expenditure rose again, there would 
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be a return of the deficit in the state budgets. In short, the potential insolvency’s problem 
would recur. 
Thus, in order to understand what are the structural reforms that Greece must implement, I 
will analyse, in the following paragraphs, the weaknesses of the Greek economic system as 
well as those activities that represent the backbone of its economy; hence, in the next 
paragraphs I’ll try to understand at which point the Greek economy can start growing again. 
 
1.2 The “weaknesses” of the Greek system 
1.2.1 Competitiveness and productivity 
As previously stated, the causes of the Greek sovereign debt crisis are varied and complex. If 
reference is made to the its “economic origin”, it should be noticed that it was the result of a   
downturn in the economic growth, public fund mismanagement, a low level of productivity 
and a lack of competitiveness. Indeed, despite, between 2000 and 2007, the Greek economy 
grew solidly and the “successes” achieved by the latter overshadowed its historical 
weaknesses and structural deficiencies, when the 2008 financial crisis broke out, all the 
inefficiencies of the system came into the picture. 
First, the huge state presence in the economy. In Greece, the massive state presence has 
crowded out private investments, as a result of a replacement of the private enterprises by the 
state in making resources employment choices. Resources have, thus, been diverted from 
productive uses to unproductive ones, from investments to current spending, thereby 
hampering the accumulation of capital in the economy and the economic development. The 
individual interests protection and the constraints introduced by the state have diverted 
production from more productive areas to less productive ones. The defense of inefficient jobs 
has led to a waste of resources which have been made flow to obsolete sectors, at the expense 
of  the innovative ones; while, protectionist policies have perpetuated inefficient industries.  
On the other hand, the high public deficit has slowed down the development of both domestic 
and foreign investments. Why? Higher public deficits imply that governments issue more 
bonds in order to obtain the necessary payment means to finance their deficits, i.e. the excess 
of government spending (including interests on debt) compared to government revenues. 
However, since saving is “constrained”, if investors/savers buy government bonds, they will 
not purchase corporate stocks and bonds; thus, less money will be available for lending to 
businesses. This means that companies will invest less; and less investments would cause the 
latter to grow less than they could or not grow at all.  
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Greece’s inability to attract sufficient capital investments also depends on the presence of 
substantial barriers in investment planning that have adverse effects on operational costs. The 
country is one of the most regulated OECD economies, and this high level of regulation 
results in unreasonable high administrative and bureaucratic costs for investing, starting a 
business or transferring real estate. The complexity and the inefficiency of the administrative 
and tax system creates legal, bureaucratic and procedural disincentives to initiate and expand 
businesses. With respect to this last issue, it should be noticed that every year, the World 
Bank publishes a survey, entitled “Doing Business”, which, on the basis of ten indicators 
(starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, 
getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
contracts and resolving insolvency), determines whether it is easy or difficult for a local 
entrepreneur to open and run a business when complying with relevant regulations. It 
provides a ranking on the ease of doing business in OECD economies. Economies are ranked 
from 1 to 189, with first place being the best. [WORLD BANK (2016)] The results of the 
analysis carried out in 2015 are shown in figure 2. 
 
    Fig.2: Ranking on Doing business indicators 
                Source: World Bank (2016) 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that, at aggregate level, Greece ranks the 60th place, while 
compared to the other Euro zone member states, the country (with the exception of Malta that 
has a doing business index of 80) occupies the lowest ranking. [WORLD BANK (2016)] 
Finally, the last issue that must be outlined is that related to the labour market. 
The presence of inflexible legal requirements with which employers are required to comply if 
they decided to hire new employees, the inflexibility, that is often attributed to the widespread 
presence of trade unions, and the improper functioning of arbitration procedures have 
dampened employers to hire more workers. [MCKINSEY&COMPANY (2012)] 
As result, as early as in the year 2009, Greece had the lowest employment turnover rate. The 
latter could be defined as the percentage of workers replaced in a given period. It is a measure 
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of the speed at which employees leave jobs in a company and are replaced by new ones. A 
high turnover rate is an indicator of a dynamic labor market where people move and find jobs 
that better match their skills, becoming more productive. Moreover, it is an indicator of 
workers’ ability to improve their living standards. Job switching, in search for higher paying 
jobs, is one of the most important ways that workers have to make more money. On the 
contrary, a low turnover rate coincides with a less dynamic labor market, lower-than-optimal 
employee productivity and income stagnation. 
 Fig.3: Labour Turnover   
       Source: “Employment in Europe 2009” DG EMPL calculation using EU LFS data 
Finally, the low participation of young university graduates in labour market not only 
confirms what has been said before, but also constitutes obstacles to entrepreneurship. 
[MCKINSEY&COMPANY (2012)] 
To tackle these problems, various structural reforms have been adopted by the Greek 
government, as prerequisites to receive the financial support provided by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund under the three 
economic adjustment programmes. However, they didn’t produce the expected results. This is 
partly due to the presence of difficulties in political implementations and the fact that their 
potential for increasing growth in the short term has been overvalued. [IOANNIDES,Y., M., 
PISSARIDES, C., A. (2015)] 
These reforms tried to improve productivity and competitiveness, affecting mainly the labour 
market. But, when the aggregated demand is depressed, this mechanism finds hardly its way 
to operate. The decrease in salaries and the moderation of wages have a downward effect on 
consumption, while the simplification of dismissal procedures has little effect on the 
recruitment process when companies have excess in their capacities and difficulties in finding 
customers. In this way only an adverse effect is achieved: an increase in unemployment. 
[IOANNIDES,Y., M., PISSARIDES, C., A. (2015)] 
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1.2.2 The Greek healthcare system    
For long time Greece has represented an emblematic example of relatively high health public 
expenditure with respect to the GDP, that, under some aspects, should be defined as 
unsustainable. This expenditure conceals numerous structural problems, which have been 
accumulated for a decade. 
Firstly, the system lacks cost containment measures and well-defined funding standards.  
The managerial structures are inadequate and, in many cases, staffed by inappropriate and 
unqualified personnel. The mechanisms for assessing needs and setting priorities are 
underdeveloped; as a consequence, the regional distribution of health resources is unequal: 
some regions are unable to satisfy the health needs of the population and this leads to a flow 
of patients to the major urban centers of Athens and Thessaloniki. [KYRIOPOULOS, K., 
GREGORY, N., ECONOMOU, G., (2003)] In addition, the mechanisms of resources 
allocation are not related to performance or output, therefore healthcare providers are poorly 
incentivized to improve quality, productivity and efficiency. 
High private spending, diffused tax evasion, high out-of-pocket payments, social security  
contribution evasion lead to regressive funding mechanisms, as low income citizens spend a 
higher portion of their income on healthcare than the rich. Inequities in access, supply and 
quality of services also exist; while, expenditure-related inefficiencies are mainly the result of 
an excessive reliance on relatively expensive inputs, as shown by the high number of 
specialists and low number of nurses. This, together with foolish pricing and refunding 
policies are factors spurring under-the-table payments and the underground economy.   
As a result, Greece’s National Health Service seems far from the principles of universality, 
parity and equity in access to performances and services on which each healthcare system 
should be based; and with the crisis, the situation has only gone worse.   
The reforms imposed by the Memoranda of Understanding of the Troika, whose key objective 
was the reduction, quickly and substantially, of the public expenditure by capping it at 6% of 
GDP, did not improve health conditions. [KENTIKELENIS, A. ET AL (2014)] On the 
contrary, they have significantly affected the health of the Greek population and their access 
to public health services.  
It started in the first months of 2010 with 60% of the cuts, all facing health: cuts to the shift 
system of hospitals and to staff salaries, reduction in medical care and operations, while the 
demand for visits increased by 25%; and thanks to Xenagiannakopùlu law the possibility of 
closing a hospital by a simple ministerial decision. 
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Between September 2010 and April 2011, the implementation of the health sector measures 
continued with the Minister Loverdos who raised the cost of the tickets and then introduced, 
for people without health insurance, the entire payment of all care at the expense of the 
citizen. At the same time, the budget of  public hospitals was cut by 26%. As a result, the 
staff’s amount of work increased and waiting lists got longer. [KENTIKELENIS, A, ET AL 
(2011)]  
The reforms also concerned the pharmaceutical expenditure; the target was the reduction in 
the spending from €4,37 billion in 2010 to €2,88 billion in 2012 and to €2 billion by 2014. 
But many unexpected results were produced: some drugs became unavailable as a 
consequence of delays in reimbursement for pharmacies, which were becoming over-
indebted; moreover, pharmaceutical companies reduced their supplies because of unpaid bills 
and low profits. [KENTIKELENIS, A, ET AL (2011)]  
Therefore, following the implementation of the reforms program, the Greek situation seems to 
have deteriorated. But this is hardly surprising. When, in fact, the fall in the economic 
capacities of citizens is accompanied by an attack to the welfare, and in particular to the 
healthcare system, the scenario that opens is likely to move towards the drama because the 
healthcare service lacks in playing its fundamental role of bonding and social safety net. 
[ECONOMOU, C. (2010)] On the other side, what appears clear by looking at the Greece’s 
status quo, is that rapid and drastic healthcare reforms with top-down imposition are doomed 
to fail. Rather, the adoption of a more incremental approach that focuses on the introduction 
of sectorial measures addressing the specific inefficiencies of the health system could be more 
effective and result in more socially sustainable policies. [ECONOMOU, C. (2010)] 
 
1.2.3 The pension system 
Continuing with the identification of the challenges that Greece should address to restore 
economic growth, it is worth noting that, among these, the biggest and the deepest problem is 
represented by its pension system. With a public pension expenditure that, in 2015, accounted 
for 17,5% of GDP, the country’s pension scheme is unsustainable. However, the problem 
does not lie in the amount of bonuses paid to pensioners or the retirement age. [NARDELLI, 
A. (2015)] 
Indeed, starting in 2011, the 13th and 14th month pay checks have been abolished, while, 
between 2011 and 2015, pension payments have been progressively reduced: pensions 
between €1000 and 1500 have been cut by 5%, those between €1500 and 2000 have been 
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decreased by 10%; a 15 % retention is applied on pensions between €2000 and €3000, while a 
30% retention is applied on those beyond €3000. As a result, the average pension nowadays is 
€700 and 45% of pensioners live below the poverty line, receiving pension payment of €665. 
[SYMEONIDIS, G. (2015)] 
Moreover, as from 2015, the supplementary pension is determined using a defined 
contributions approach. Even the retirement age has been increased from 60 and 65, 
respectively for women and men, to 67. Persons of 62 years of age, having contributed for at 
least 40 years (the minimum number of the years of contribution is, instead, 35 if the 
individual started working before 1993), are entitled to a full pension. Retirement at age 62 is 
possible even for those persons having less than 40 years of contribution; however, in such a 
case, the amount of pension benefits that the individual is entitled to receive is reduced by 
1/200 for each calendar month the pension in taken before age 67. [SYMEONIDIS, G. 
(2015)] 
Finally, as part of Greece’s pension system’s reform process, many of the larger auxiliary 
pension funds of employees have been merged into one (ETEA) and new transparency’s rules 
have been launched. A 2013 law requires all pensioners to be issued a SSN (Social Security 
Number) and establishes a computerized system of all funds responsible for incorporating 
these numbers before paying pensions. Moreover, in September 2013, a new system called 
Ergani was introduced to cross-check and provide information for employees and employers 
who avoid paying contributions. [SYMEONIDIS, G. (2013)] 
Thus, the current requirements that must be satisfied in order to be qualified for retirement 
benefits, in case of both early retirement and old-age retirement, as well as the amount of 
pension benefits paid are completely in line with what could be observed in most EU 
countries. But then, what is Greek pension problem? 
Greece’s pension problem is related to two main issues. Firstly, the inability of Greek social 
security funds to fund themselves and their strong reliance on government transfer payments. 
Indeed, in 2014 alone, just 57% of total amount of pension benefits paid was financed by 
pension contributions provided by employees and employers to social security funds, while 
43% was covered by the Greek government through general taxation; this scenario did not 
change even during the years of economic growth.  
The second issue, instead, concerns the pension funds’ over-investment in Greek government 
bonds. Indeed, considering their financial assets, it is possible to observe that three-quarters of 
the latter are made up of government bonds, cash and deposits, whose returns may just as well 
be zero. This investment allocation is imposed by law and it requires Greek social security 
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funds to keep a minimum of 77% of their assets in government bonds; as a result, the returns 
that latter could realize strongly depend on the conditions in the Greek government bond 
market. [EUROSTAT (2016)]   
Therefore, at this stage, the obvious questions would be: if employers paid a higher amount of 
pension contributions, would Greece’s pension system be more viable? And, more generally, 
what measures should be undertaken to make Greek pension system more sustainable? 
Before answering the first question, it is worth pointing out that, in Greece, employers’ 
contributions (equal to 4-5% of GDP) are slightly smaller than those of households, and way 
lower than the EU average (almost half). However, although the Greek government has 
recently taken actions with regard to this issue by adopting a measure envisaging a 1% 
increase in social security contributions paid by employers, it should be noticed that this 
would have a limited impact. [ADAMOPOULOS, A. (2016)] 
The problem concerns the country’s  labour market structure, and specifically the excessively 
large number of self-employed and contributing family workers, which is well above the 
European average. It is, thus, clear that, in this framework, increasing the headline or effective 
rate of employer contributions would make little financial difference unless it could be 
possible to adopt a two-fold approach. The latter would consist in increasing real wages 
without increasing unemployment and/or restructuring Greece’s economy through a reduction 
in the number of small and family businesses and an increase in the number of larger 
businesses. 
On the contrary, the sustainability of Greek pension system could be ensured mainly through 
the implementation of the two types of reforms. Firstly, pensions should be cut down 
eventually to what the social security funds can pay for without further subsidy; in other 
words, they should be almost halved. [NARDELLI, A. (2015)] On the other hand, a second 
reform would consist in providing pension funds a proper source of investment income. 
Indeed, with interest rates predicted to stay low for long period of time, it is absolutely 
essential to consider the possibility of allowing these funds to invest a larger fraction of their 
portfolios in assets other than Greek bonds and bank deposits. In this respect, foreign assets 
would represent a good alternative since they could provide higher returns and 
contemporaneously break the loop between the state of the country’s economy and the returns 
on pension fund assets. [PETROFF, A. (2015)] 
However, the adoption of these two measures would not be enough, especially if we consider 
that in Greece the size of the deficit in the pension system is 9% of GDP, compared with 3% 
of GDP in Germany. [EUROSTAT (2015)] 
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Therefore, in addition to the measures previously outlined, the Greek government should also 
further restrict limits on early retirements, prevent de facto private sector employers from 
“uploading” their employees into the public sector social security system, improve the 
pension funds’ management and re-capitalize the latter by transferring to them part of 
privatization receipts. 
1.2.4 Corruption and patronage 
Greece’s weaknesses arise from different shortages that, as we have seen, the Troika has tried 
to address by requiring Greece to implement reforms and austerity measures. However, 
already at this stage, it is possible to notice that the latter have failed in stimulating economic 
growth and reducing the inefficiencies of its economic system. One of the causes of this 
failure could be identified in corruption and widely spread practices of patronage that have 
always characterized Greece’s politics. They have led to the creation of a system where 
political support is provided in return for material benefits. The “system of benefits” has, in 
turn, had as consequences an inefficient provision of civil services, rules limiting competition 
and impositions of levies on transactions benefitting third parties. [MICHAS, T. (2011)] 
Moreover, there is another significant type of benefit provided by patronage politicians that 
seriously harm the structure of effective competition: public procurement to private 
enterprises. It leads Greece’s enterprises to focus more on the establishment of stable 
connections with the political power than on solving their competitiveness problems; indeed, 
these connections are precious to businesses because they “protect” uncompetitive firms or 
grant them monopoly rents.  
The direct result of this distorted systemic strategy of “putting politics above market”, a 
strategy in which the logics of patronage have crushed those of the market, has been the 
development of a system that encourages corruption, discourages wealth creation, limits the 
foreign investments and the competition in a formerly weak economy. [MICHAS, T. (2011)] 
But, despite patronage and corruption combating initiatives have been launched since 2010, 
the situation does not appear to be improved; the presence of strong centers of interest that try 
to take advantage from the political activity, the media, main characters of the disinformation 
campaign, the lack of control and transparency and the close link between the legislative and 
the executive power, remain only some of the factors that represent a danger for the policies 
of financial rebalancing of the country. [BARBER, T. (2014)] 
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1.2.5 Tax evasion and  high taxation 
The last stage of this preliminary analysis will focus on the “fiscal origin” of the Greek crisis. 
Indeed, the crisis was also the result of an excessive public expenditure which was not 
balanced with fiscal yields of equivalent amount. One of the most important causes of this 
low level of public revenues registered by Greece is the high taxation on both personal and 
corporate income which encourages tax evasion. 
The last report of the Greek Financial Police (Sdoe) highlights that in Greece, against a total 
fiscal evasion of €42 billion, only 5.000 taxpayers declare an income above €100.000 per 
year. Among the “small tax evaders” there is also 43% of pensioners, who don’t pay any tax 
on the compensations derived from the extra work they do. 
The source of the problem has to be searched in the Greek contribution system. Greece’s 
fiscal system provides for a distinction between direct taxes and indirect taxes. Direct taxes 
are mainly represented by taxes on corporate income, with a single rate equals to 29% applied 
to the taxable income, and taxes on personal income. 
The personal income tax is, on the contrary, progressive, with tax rates varying from 22% to 
42% (applied above €42000) with high jumps from a “curb tax” to another. 
Until 2009, when Greece had to “adjust” its fiscal system, the progressive system was the 
most accentuated in Euro zone because it was characterized by a great number of exempt 
individuals, which in proportion was only lower than some richer countries like France and 
Scandinavian countries. [MITSOPOLOUS, M., PELAGIDIS, T. (2011)] 
Incentives to tax evasion stem also by the fact that the tax system is perceived as unfair and 
the allocation of the resources as ineffective: more than two-third of revenues go to the central 
government while social security funds are in receipt of almost all the remainder; local 
government’s levies represent only a limited portion of overall taxation, amounting to 0,8% of 
GDP. [EUROSTAT (2013)] 
In this framework, it does not surprise anyone that the major source of revenues are indirect 
taxes, whose contribution, despite being below the EU average, only in 2013, has accounted 
for 13,6% of GDP, while the revenues derived from personal income taxes accounted for 
6,9% of GDP against a 9,4% European average. [EUROSTAT (2013)] 
Among the indirect taxes, the VAT is one of the most important. It was introduced in 1987 
and later modified in order to comply with the EU provisions. Today, the standard rate is 
23%, the reduced rate 13%, while a 6% tax rate applies to hotel accommodation services, 
20 
newspapers, periodicals, books, medicines and vaccines for human medicine. [EUROSTAT 
(2015)] 
Starting from 2010, when the sovereign debt crisis came to light, the Greek fiscal system was 
subjected to a radical change: the overall tax burden has increased rapidly and the strongest 
rise came from personal income tax, real estate taxes, excise duty and VAT. 
[MITSOPOLOUS, M., PELAGIDIS, T. (2011)] However, since the increase in the tax burden 
was accompanied by cuts in public expenditure, the first did not result in an improvement in 
the welfare level. [ARTAVANIS, N., TECH, V., MORSE, A., TSOUTSOURA, M. (2012)]  
In addition, what is clear by looking at the Greek past experience is that rising taxes on people 
who already exclusively bear the heavy tax burden and on productive sectors would simply 
encourage emigration, limit production and lead to less social contribution. It would also push 
productive sectors of the economy either outside the country or to the border of black market. 
Indeed, increased taxes, while having allowed the Greek government to meet the targets set at 
the European level, have represented, in the reality, a limit to the investments and growth. 
[PELAGIDIS, T. (2015)] 
Therefore, a way to solve this problem would not be to increase the burden of people and 
businesses that already pay taxes, but rather eliminate the inefficiencies in the taxes’ 
collection process, especially by closing fiscal loopholes and enhancing tax compliance. To 
this end, the focus should be on the development of a fair tax system that could efficiently 
combat tax evasion and funding social protection networks. A mean to achieve these goals 
could be moving the income tax schedule towards a flat income tax structure. But why a flat 
tax? The optimal tax literature provides arguments supporting a flat tax structure. Indeed, 
according to the latter, a flat tax substantially reduces administrative costs and government 
corruption, lowers the tax burden, thereby, improving allocative efficiency and increases 
reporting of income and, thus, it is conductive to tax compliance. [HALL, R., RABUSHKA, 
A. (1981)] Hence, the overall effect of the adoption of a flat taxation system would be an 
increase in tax revenues as a result of an increase in the compliance response and allocative 
efficiency, and a reduction in corruption.  
Therefore, in this perspective, a possible solution for Greece could be that of adopting a flat 
tax (whose rate should be closer to the lowest tax rate) on personal income and corporate 
profits. The reduction in tax rate should be accompanied by a broadening of the tax base. 
Progressivity could be achieved by simply adjusting the rate and the basic tax allowance (and 
of course closing the loopholes). [KOTSOGIANNIS, C. (2012)] Finally, alongside the 
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introduction of a flat tax, taxes on interests, dividends and capital gains should also be 
eliminated in order to avoid double taxation. 
The strength of such a tax system would lie in its simplicity; and as a result of this “increased 
simplicity”, both compliance and control costs would be greatly reduced. In addition, a flat 
taxation system would provide a neutral incentive to investments, allowing capital to flow to 
the more productive activities rather than the most fiscally advantageous ones. Moreover, a 
depart from a progressive taxation system would also incentivize labor productivity and 
workers’ access to employment market.  
All this, together with the development of a credible set of measures aimed at enhancing tax 
enforcements, such as an improvement in the independence of tax administration bodies, 
better-information reporting requirements and effective audits, would be a step in the right 
direction.  
1.3 Growth opportunity: the economic resources 
1.3.1 Some data in imports, exports and tourism 
After having analyzed the country’s weaknesses, the next step is the identification of the 
sources on which Greece could rely to start growing again.  
Greece’s economic recovery should start from the country’s strongest sectors: exports and 
tourism, which represent one of the main sources of revenues for the Greek economy. Indeed, 
according to a report by the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), the total 
contribution of tourism industry to Greek GDP was €29.4 billion in 2014 (17.3% of GDP) and 
this contribution has grown by 3.2% to €30.3 billion (17.6% of GDP) in 2015. [WTTC(2015)] 
However, this sector shows some structural deficiencies that worsen Greece’s competitive 
position in traditional markets and reduce its ability to attract tourists from markets such as 
China and Russia. [MCKINSEY&COMPANY (2012)] 
These inefficiencies arise from an incomplete infrastructure network, an inadequate training 
of educational workers, a low development of real estate plans and investments due to 
cumbersome licensing processes and volatile tax framework and the inability to provide high 
quality services. As a result, 67% of hotels is concentrated into the four major cities, and the 
tourist season is much concentrated in the summer months. [INSTITUTE SETE (2015)] 
Moreover, the amount of money that tourists spend during their visits in Greece is relatively 
less than that spent in competing destinations. For instance, people spend only €146 per day 
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in Greece whereas they spend €200 in Italy and €162 in Turkey. [MCKINSEY&COMPANY 
(2012)]  
Thus, new measures must be adopted; in particular, it should be developed a strategy aimed at 
realizing a shift in tourism sector toward larger, "unexploited" and emerging markets, while 
defending the core ones, attracting higher-income tourists, and encouraging investments to 
increase the quality of the services provided. [MCKINSEY&COMPANY (2012)] 
However, it should be noticed that despite these difficulties, the trend in tourism sector has 
been positive even during the past years. In 2013, according to a research conducted by SETE 
Intelligence (InSETE), tourism showed a growth of 11,3%, when the total GDP is estimated 
to have decreased by €3,5 billion in nominal term and increased by some 0,8% in real terms 
due to the deflation. [INSTITUTE SETE (2014)] 
Moreover, the positive trend in tourism, along with a decrease in imports caused by a massive 
unemployment and contraction in demand, have allowed Greece to record a current account 
surplus of 0.90% of GDP in 2014. Indeed, in 2014, imports have decreased by 1,4%, while 
exports have increased by 6,7%. [EUROSTAT (2015)] 
Greece exports are primarily fish and agricultural products, even if the exports of cement, 
aluminum and semi-finished products have increased during the last years; while it imports 
oil, pharmaceuticals, electronic equipment, engines, machines, pumps and plastic. 
By analysing Greece’s trade relations, it is possible to observe that the country is “projected 
towards  East”, going against the European partners. Russia is the main country from which 
the goods are heavily imported. In 2014, this has accounted for 10% of Greece’s imports. 
Instead, Turkey is the main country from where goods are exported. According to statistics, in 
the same year, it has absorbed 12% of the Greek exports. Moreover, the country has 
strengthened the commercial ties with non-European countries. In 2014, Greece’s non-
European exports have accounted as 52% of the total exports, while its imports have 
accounted as 51% of the total imports. [OEC (2014)] 
Finally, it should be noticed that the Greek Center for Planning and Economic Research 
estimates that the revenues associated to the sectors of tourism, transportation and the exports, 
in 2015, have been equal to €55 billion that is the 30% of GDP of Greece. [KEPE (2015)] 
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1.3.2 The natural resources             
There is another resource on which Greece could draw, and this resource is the subsoil. Many 
studies have, indeed, proved the presence of hydrocarbon deposits, particularly in the 
Mediterranean Sea. [PARIS, A., DEDES, S., LAMPRIS N. (2011)] 
US Geological Survey estimates a potential for 28 millions of barrels in both Aegean and 
Ionian Sea. In other words, Greece could potentially solve its public debt problem by 
developing its new-found gas and oil, since it has been estimated that the exploitation of the 
latter could allow the country to raise about €302 billion over 25 years; however, this would 
obviously depend on the gas and oil’s prices over those years. [ENGDAHL, F., W. (2012)] 
The size of discoveries is such that the knowledge of the presence of these deposits, would 
have improved Greece’s negotiating positions. It would have allowed to reduce the 
government’s divestitures and the massive cut in public expenditures as required by the 
European Union and obtain the assistance of the IMF. [ENGDAHL, F., W. (2012)] In 
addition, the emergence of this new industry would have contributed to improve the social 
and economic conditions of the country, with huge implications on trades, immigration 
policies and security. 
However, the country lacks liquidity and the context of uncertainty concerning its permanence 
in the Euro zone, makes it difficult for the latter to raise the necessary funds to proceed with 
the exploitation of the natural resources. This would require paying expensive consultancy 
fees, taking very high risks and investing significant capital that Greece just doesn’t have. 
Thus, a more concrete alternative would be that of promoting and attracting foreign 
investments through tax incentives for oil and gas exploitation; and once foreign capital has 
been attracted, the government should let privately-owned companies implement their own 
efficiency measures, tax them properly, grant them appropriate licenses and ensure that their 
environmental protection plans are sound. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 THE PUBLIC DEBT’S PROBLEM 
 
2.1 Greece as permanent borrower 
The President of the ECB Mario Draghi, at the conference of “SZ FINANCE Day 2015” said: 
“Euro was not created to have permanent creditors and debtors. It was created with the 
expectation that countries would be able to stand on their own two feet, without continuous 
help from others”. [DRAGHI, M. (2015)] 
However, contrary to hopes, according to a research published by Greece’s newspaper 
Kathimerini, large public deficits were one of the characteristic traits of the Greek economy 
both before and after the country joined the European Union in 1981. 
It is possible to define three phases in the process of accumulation of government debt. 
The first phase started in 1981, with coming to power of socialist party PASOK, under the 
leadership of Andreas Papandreou. The Papandreou government placed huge emphasis on 
nationalization and income redistribution; between 1981 and 1989, the role of state in 
economy was significantly expanded: public enterprises and organisations were created in 
energy, development finance, commercial property and export promotion. Moreover, a 
number of ailing firms were also nationalized through the Industrial Reconstruction 
Organization. [ALOGOSKOUFIS, G. (1995)] 
As a result of these nationalization and income redistribution policies, public deficits and 
debts started getting out of control; the fiscal deficit rose from 2,6% of GDP in 1980 to 9% in 
1981, and it remained high throughout the 1980s. The public debt passed from about 20% of 
GDP in the early 1980s to almost 100% of GPD in the early 1990s. [ALOGOSKOUFIS, G. 
(2013)]  
         Fig.4: The accumulation of government debt        
Source: E   Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of the European Economy, (Spring 2015)  
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Fig.5: Deficits of the general government 
         Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of the European Economy, (Spring 2015) 
There are three reasons for the rapid rise in the government debt-to-GDP ratio during 1980s. 
Firstly, primary deficits increased during the 1980s because government revenues failed to 
keep pace with the rise in primary expenditure, and as a result high interest payments acted as 
the sources of “fiscal destabilization”. Primary deficit is defined as “the difference between 
current government spending on goods and services and total current revenues from all types 
of taxes net of transfer payments”. [THE ECONOMIC TIMES] It indicates, how much of the 
public borrowings are going to cover expenses that differ from the interest payments on 
accumulated debts. The primary expenditure represents, instead, the spending allocated to the 
provision of public services, excluding interest payments on debt. 
The second reason was the slowdown in economic growth, which speeded up the process of 
debt accumulation. 
Finally, the number of guarantees for loans of both private and public enterprises and 
organizations provided by the government significantly rose during this period. By the year of 
1989, they had risen to 32% of GDP and in the next three years, half of those had to be paid 
out by the government; this caused an additional increase in the public debt of the Greek 
economy. [ALOGOSKOUFIS, G. (2013)] 
The second phase of the process of government debt accumulation started in 1990 and ended 
in 2001. During those years, public debt stood at less than 100% of GDP. 
[ALOGOSKOUFIS, G. (2013)] This was the result of a process of fiscal adjustment pursued 
throughout the 1990s, which, together with other measures, was aimed at guaranteeing 
Greece’s fulfilment of the constraints established by the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, between 
1990 and 2001, the year in which Greece entered the European Monetary Union, “New 
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Democracy”, a Greek conservative political party, made significant efforts to tackle the 
deficit. A first attempt to restructure the economy was made, adopting measures ensuring 
prices’ full liberalization, deregulation, close monitoring of government enterprises, social 
security reform, privatization and infrastructure investments. [ALOGOSKOUFIS, G. (1995)] 
Moreover, over this period, GDP growth rate gradually increased, additionally contributing to 
the stabilization of the government debt-to-GDP ratio. [OECD (1993)] 
The third phase is, instead, that of Euro area participation, from 2001 until 2008, before the 
international financial crisis started with the collapse of  Lehman Brothers. As many times 
mentioned, the period of Euro zone participation was a golden era for the Greek economy. 
The growth rate increased, inflation remained subdued, and unemployment fell. The ratio of 
public debt-to-GDP was levelled off at 100% and there were not solvency problems. 
However, the fiscal situation remained precarious: Greece’s fiscal deficits started widening 
immediately after the country’s entry into the Euro area. In 2001, the country’s deficit 
equalled 6,1% of GDP; even though it has dipped slightly between the years of 2004-2007, 
during the government of Costas Karamanlis, the deficit continued its upward trend. Indeed, 
at the end of 2008, it was 10,2% of GDP. This was mainly due to the fall in government 
revenues relatively to GDP, while primary expenditure kept rising. [ALOGOSKOUFIS, G. 
(2013)] 
Finally, when, in 2008, the financial crisis peaked, Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 112,9%; 
but the latter has started to grow rapidly assuming the value of 177% in 2015, above the 
maximum sustainable level for Greece, defined by the IFM economists to be 120% of GDP. 
[EUROSTAT (2015)] 
Continuing with the analysis of the process of Greece’s public debt accumulation, it is worth 
noting that two could be the main problems behind this accelerating debt-to-GDP ratio issue. 
The first was a too high pre-existing debt level, that had directly resulted from the inefficient 
fiscal policies of the previous Greek governments, which left no room to absorb the increasing 
debts generated through the recession; the second reason is the existing high structural deficits 
in the government budget. Deficits are, indeed, financed by borrowing, and continued 
borrowing leads to an accumulation of debt. But, only after 2010, significant efforts were 
made to minimize budget deficits. [ALOGOSKOUFIS, G. (2013)] 
In February 2010, the new government of George Papandreou admitted the unreliability of 
government deficit and debt statistics and revised the 2009 deficit estimates upwards; 
consequently, the country’s government deficit  passed from 6%-8% to 12,7% of GDP. [THE 
ECONOMIST (2010)] In April 2010, the 2009 reported deficit was revised again; it was 
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increased to 13,6% and at the time of the final revision performed by Eurostat, it ended at 
15,7% of GDP. [CHRISTIDES, G. (2013)] 
Investors’ trust in Greek statistics, never solid, completely eroded. Two of the three main 
credit-rating agencies, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) responded by downgrading the 
Greek government’s debt to junk bond status, below the investment grade. 
In May 2010,the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF responded by launching the 
first economic adjustment programme for Greece in order to avoid sovereign default and 
provide financial support to the country. However, one year later, in 2011, Greece needed to 
receive a second bailout (which was approved by all parties only in March 2012) because of 
the recession in place and the delayed implementation by the Greek government of the 
conditions agreed in the bailout programme. [PETRAKIS, M. (2010)] 
In addition, in December 2012, the Troika accepted to provide another round of significant 
debt reduction measures; meanwhile, the IMF extended its support with an extra €8,2 billion 
to be transferred during the period from January 2015 until March 2016. [SENGAR,  S. 
(2015)] 
But that did not sign the end of Greek drama. In August 2015, due to the country’s inability to 
overcome the economic recession and restore the investors’ confidence, the uncertainty about 
the Greece’s permanence in the Euro zone and the financial instability that ultimately led to 
banks’ closure and the imposition of capital controls, a third bailout program, worth €86 
billion, was ratified by all parties. [BUSINESS INSIDER (2015)]    
But, what are then the reasons behind these high levels of government debt and deficit? 
Firstly, Greece’s participation to the EU in 1981 and its entry into the Euro zone in 2001. The 
budget deficit has its roots in the collapse of the country’s industry caused by the 
establishment of a common market. Then, the EU’s agricultural policy and the participation to 
the Euro area carried the contractions of  Greece’s economy to the extremes. 
Secondly, the huge military expenditure (which only in 2014 has accounted for 2,4% of GDP) 
and the tax evasion (it has been estimated that, in Greece, around €20 billion go uncollected 
every year).  
Finally, the high interest rates on debts. Indeed, a large portion of government spending are 
used for interests payment. Only in 2011, these expenses were 11,75% of GDP; in 2012 the 
interest charges were 9,12% of GDP, while in 2014, these accounted for 4,3% of GDP. 
[OECD(2014)] However, despite the interest expenditure has been shrinking for the last years 
thanks to the favourable conditions imposed by the Eurogroup, a large portion of the Greek 
“new debt” goes to pay the pre-existing creditors. Therefore, it follows that if Greece wants to 
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end this “diabolic loop”, the only concrete road would be that of implementing the reforms 
imposed by international creditors. This would allow the country not only to solve its 
structural problems, but also to take part to the ECB’s open market operations, such as the 
quantitative easing; and taking part to these operations would have as outcome, inter alia, the 
reduction of the cost of the government debt. 
2.2 The derivative contracts that allowed to enter in the Euro: the role of the 
Goldman Sachs 
As highlighted in the previous section, large public deficits and debts have marked the Greek 
economy both before and after the country joined the European Union in 1981. With respect 
to this last issue, it should be noticed that over the years, Greece employed in different ways 
“creative accounting” to mask its high public debt and deficit, succeeding in this way to skirt 
European debt and deficit limits. What follows is a description of some of the major 
accounting tricks used by Greece in recent years.  
In 2001, a large portion of the Greek debt was denominated in yen and dollars. In that year, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio was 100,1% and the public debt was €151,9 billion. [THE 
ECONOMIST (2015)] Greece, already a European Union Member State, was therefore not 
able to comply with debt and deficit criteria established by the Maastricht Treaty. These 
criteria stipulate that no Euro zone member may have a debt greater than 60% of its GDP or a 
budget deficit greater than 3% of its GDP. [TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (1992)] 
Thus, in order to meet Euro zone limits on government borrowing, in June 2000, the Greek 
government entered into currency swap contracts with the investment bank Goldman Sachs, 
which allowed the first to reduce the big weight of its debt and join the Euro zone. 
[DUNBAR, N., MARTINUZZI, E. (2012)] 
A currency swap is a foreign exchange derivative between two parties to exchange 
the principal and/or interest payments on a loan in one currency in equivalent amounts, in net 
present value terms, in another currency. Indeed, in a currency swap, one currency is bought 
at the spot rate and date, while the transaction is reversed at the forward date and rate. Thus, 
once the swap expires, both parties return to their original positions. The currency swap acts 
as an investment in one currency and a loan in the other. Moreover, there is an interest rate 
differential over the period of the swap, which is paid between the two parties. 
The deal with Goldman Sachs “helped Greece to transfer the debt from one currency to 
another”. Indeed, the Goldman Sachs transaction swapped debt issued by Greece in dollars 
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and yen for Euros using a historical exchange rate, lower than the prevailing rate. That 
allowed Greece to receive a far higher amount than the actual euro market value of 10 billion 
dollars or yen. In that way Goldman Sachs secretly arranged additional credit of up to $1 
billion for Greece. The effect of this was to create an advance payment by Goldman to 
Greece, and an increasing flow of interest payments to Greece for the whole duration of the 
swap. Goldman would be, in turn, compensated for these non-standard cash flows at maturity, 
receiving a large “balloon” cash payment from Greece. [BALZLI, B. (2010)] 
These cash flows were used to help the Hellenic Republic to lower the debt-to-GDP ratio 
from 107% in 2001, to 104.9% in 2002 (by funding buybacks), to reduce its foreign 
denominated debt into Euro terms by €2.367 billion and to lower interest payments from 7.4% 
in 2001 to 6.4% in 2002.[MIDDLETON, R. (2012)] 
But why the negative value of the transaction has not appeared on the liability side of 
Greece’s balance sheet? 
The answer can be found in ESA95, a manual on government deficit and debt accounting, 
published by the European Commission and Eurostat in 2002, which does not require to 
record transactions involving financial derivatives. Thus, the Greek public debt financed by 
Goldman Sachs was hidden in public balance sheets thanks to a “trick” that translated the loan 
into a currency trade. 
Only in November 2009, Eurostat undertook an EDP (Excessive Deficit Procedure) 
Methodological visit to Greece, the results of which were shown in a Commission report in 
the January of 2010. The Excessive Deficit Procedure is part of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) which is an agreement, among the 28 Member States of the European Union, to 
facilitate and maintain the stability of the Economic and Monetary Union. It consists of fiscal 
monitoring of European Union Members by the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers, and the formulation of a yearly recommendation for policy actions to guarantee a 
full compliance also in the medium-term. If a Member State exceeds the SGP's outlined 
maximum limit for government deficit and debt (3% and 60% of GDP respectively), the 
supervision and request for corrective action will take place through the declaration of an 
Excessive Deficit Procedure; and if these corrective actions continue to be absent after 
multiple warnings, the Member State can ultimately be subject to economic sanctions. 
The January 2010 report clarified the presence of cross-currency swaps and the presence of an 
interest rate swap (IRS) linked to them. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010)] 
These cross-currency swaps involved the exchange of payments denominated in Euros for 
payments that are denominated in other currencies; they had different maturities, varying from 
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2002 to 2013; but, while Goldman Sachs paid the notional amount in Euros at the time of the 
conclusion of the agreement, Greece did not transfer the equivalent amount in dollars and 
yens; according to Eurostat, the transaction was a loan on the part of the American investment 
bank.  
In addition, the Eurostat observed that none of the transactions has occurred at the market 
exchange rates prevailing at the time. Using below-market exchange rates Goldman and 
Greece were able to create a sort of “mismatch”, worth about €2.4 billion, between the 
domestic and foreign currency swap notional.  
The largest portion of the traded currency swaps were fixed-for-fixed swaps (an arrangement 
between two parties in which both parties pay a fixed interest rate) with the option, 
exercisable by Greece, to be converted into fixed-for-floating swaps (arrangement between 
two parties, in which one party pays a fixed rate, while the other pays a floating rate). 
[HUNEKE, S., C. (2012)] 
Moreover, as mentioned before, since the “off-market” cross-currency swaps had a positive 
value for Greece, they effectively represented a loan from Goldman. Thus, in order to pay 
back the loan, Greece entered into a separate off-market IRS which had a positive value of 
€2.8 billion for the American investment bank (this amount included a €400 million charge 
for unwinding some additional swaps). The flow of fixed-rate payments from Goldman to 
Greece was more than balanced by an “opposite” stream of floating-rate payments that would 
last until 2019, paying off Goldman’s loan, together with interests and fees. 
But, as the European Commission’s Statistical Office pointed out, there was more to this 
unusual financial derivative instrument. Indeed, according to the report, the floating rate was 
“actively managed” and manipulated several times. Moreover, the IRS also included a two-
year period of grace before Greece would have to repay Goldman Sachs. However, it did not 
represent an interest holiday, as the interest and fees were getting accumulated and added to 
the loan balance. 
The effects of the actions undertaken by Greece became clear only in early 2005 when, as a 
result of these transactions, the Hellenic Republic owed €5,1 billion, versus €2,8 billion 
initially borrowed. [DUNBAR , N., MARTINUZZI, E. (2012)] 
In addition, in August 2005, the interest rate swap was consistently restructured: both the 
fixed and the floating component were reviewed, while the maturity was delayed. Moreover, 
there was a reduction in the notional amount and therefore on the amount of interests paid by 
Greece. At the same time, Goldman Sachs sold the interest rate swap to the National Bank of 
Greece. The amount paid by the latter equalled the current value of the derivative contract. 
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This operation effectively represented the payment made by Greece to Goldman Sachs. 
[BALZI, B. (2010)] 
Finally, in 2008, the value of the contract was reviewed again: there was a reduction in the 
notional amount and in the spread applied to the floating rate. [FOLEY, S. (2011)] 
Therefore, here, one question comes to mind: how costly was it for Greece? 
In 2001, Greece publicly issued bonds with a 5,35% coupon and a ten-year maturity. If 
Goldman’s €2,8 billion loan had been compounded at this rate for four years, the Hellenic 
Republic would have had a €3,4 billion debt in 2005. On the contrary, getting a loan amount 
of €5,1 billion corresponds to Greece paying an exorbitant annual interest rate of 16,3%.  
But, rather than facing up to its problems in 2005, Greece extended the maturity to 2037 from 
2019 in order to lower annual costs, with a new two-year grace period. The attempts were 
useless, and in 2010, Eurostat obliged Greece to reinstate the hidden debt on its balance sheet. 
[DUBAR, N. (2012)]  
Moreover, this was not the only financial trick used by the political leaders to mask Greece’s 
true debt. Different surveys show that similar tactics were replicated to allow the Greek 
governments to hide its mounting debt; and, in these operations, derivatives have played a key 
role. 
However, there have been alarm bells. 
In 2005, George Alogoskoufis, Greece’s Minister of Economy and Finance, criticized the deal 
in the Parliament because it would have obliged the government to make big payments to 
Goldman until 2019; while, in 2008, Eurostat reported that “in a number of instances, the 
observed securitization operations seem to have been purportedly designed to achieve a given 
accounting result, irrespective of the economic merit of the operation”. 
Besides Greece, also other European countries used financial tricks to “adjust” their public 
accounts. Germany excluded hospitals from the public sector. France decided that the state-
owned telephone company’s pension fund did not fall within the public authority’s 
competencies, likewise Belgium sold some 1,000 tons of gold into the market. [GOLD 
SILVER WORLDS (2013)] 
Finally, the Goldman Sachs deal, a “very sexy story between two sinners”, as it has been 
defined by Christoforos Sardelis, also highlighted two weaknesses of the European Monetary 
Union. The lack of effective audit mechanisms of the public finances and the premature Euro 
adoption. 
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Euro should have been the final stage of the process of political and fiscal integration; instead 
it has been used to accelerate the integration processes, leading the political purposes through 
the tensions caused by the monetary dysfunction. 
 
2.3 The public balance sheet disarray 
2.3.1 The public resources management and the balance “sheet’s catchs”    T 
Since joining the Euro, Greece's government financial positions considerably deviated from 
the debt and deficit limits established by the Stability and Growth Pact.  
In this framework, the European Union expressed several doubts about the veracity of the 
fiscal data submitted by the Greek government. According to the Eurostat, Greek public debt 
in 2002 was five times as high as that stated. The misreporting concerned the data on the 
health care system, revenues from VAT and defence expenditures.  
Moreover, many companies claimed a huge credit against the Greek government. In 
particular, between 2007 and 2009, the pharmaceutical companies had accumulated about €6 
billion debt to public hospitals. At the same time, other ministries were in debt of 
approximately €6 billion. [DELIOLANES, D. (2011)] 
In addition, the state provided guarantees for public entities and enterprises, but the amount of 
such guarantees were not recorded in the public accounts. The concealed debt amounted to 
€26 billion, about 10% of GDP. Approximately half of this debt had to be paid by the 
publicly-owned company managing the country’s rail network, OSE (Hellenic Railways 
organization). 
On 22 October 2009, Eurostat published a report on the Greek government deficit and debt 
statistics for the period 2007-2009. It is a report published for each Member State every two 
years. The report is prepared on the basis of the financial data that the Member States are 
obliged to provide, in cooperation with Eurostat, within the “European Statistical System”. 
The latter is a partnership between the statistical authority of the European Union, which is 
the Commission (Eurostat), and the National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) and other national 
authorities responsible in each Member State for the development, production and 
dissemination of European statistics. In addition, as mentioned above, the European 
Commission may also initiate a formal investigation proceedings, aka the Excessive Debt 
Procedure, where it considers that the financial data provided are inaccurate and incomplete. 
The inspected Member State has to cooperate and send the periodical data revision reports to 
the Commission. 
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It is precisely during the analysis of the EDP notification tables, covering the government 
deficit and debt data sent by the Hellenic authorities to Eurostat, that the ECOFIN, Economics 
and Financial Affairs Council, rose doubts about the accuracy of data transmitted by the 
Greek government. 
The Hellenic authorities had often transmitted reports containing faked and omitted data over 
recent years, forcing the ECOFIN to perform continue controls and revisions. Revisions of 
this magnitude have been infrequent in other EU Member States, but have occurred in Greece 
on several occasions. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010)] 
Indeed, as early as 2004, the European Commission expressed several doubts about the 
veracity of the data of debt and deficit submitted by the Greek government for the period 
2000-2003. In September, the transmitted data were revised by the European Union’s experts. 
Moreover, in the same year, because of the incompleteness of the data provided by the Greek 
government, the European Commission initiated an infringement procedure. The latter is a 
procedure that the European Commission can initiate against Member States that have failed 
to fulfil a Treaty obligation.   
In 2007 the infringement proceeding was closed. 
In addition, from 2005 until 2009, the Hellenic authorities were forced by the Commission to 
continually review the estimates of the government deficit and debt.  
Therefore, in the light of the aforementioned situation and in order to guarantee the reliability 
of the information provided by the Greek government, Eurostat decided to organise from 
2010 a series of visits, in cooperation with the Hellenic authorities.   
On the other side, in May 2010, Greece introduced a new law establishing the EL.STAT, 
the Hellenic Statistical Authority. It is an autonomous legal person governed by public law, 
independent from the Greek government and subject only to the supervision of the Hellenic 
Parliament.  
Finally, the European Community made a protocol, ESA95, that each Member States have to 
meet in the classification of public bodies. This manual requires that Member States provide 
information on transfers made by the government to the public institutions. The introduction 
of the protocol had two objectives: controlling the entities with a particularly high debt and 
preventing the perpetration of accounting tricks designed to hide a portion of the liabilities. 
Notwithstanding the measures taken, the situation does not appear to have improved. The 
reports drawn up following the visits, undertaken by the Commission not only in 2010 but 
also in subsequent years, highlighted the inadequacy of the Greek statistical system and the 
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incompetence of institutions in making effective decisions. Indeed, in Greece, the lack of well 
trained and specialised administrative staff and adequate data collection system, the absence 
of cooperation between the Ministry of Finance’s statistical offices and government 
accountancy offices has led to the creation of a fiscal system, totally free of objectivity in data 
analysis, and subjected to indications of current leadership. 
2.4The probability of default analyzed through CDSs                                       In 
In 2015, as repeatedly mentioned, Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio equaled 177%, a clearly higher 
value than 120% of GDP, which has been defined by the IFM economists to be the maximum 
sustainable level for Greece. Since the debt-to-GDP ratio can be considered as a measure of a 
country’s ability to pay off its debt, it seems, therefore, clear that the probability that Greece 
would not be able to pay back the latter and, thus, consequently forced to declare sovereign 
debt default is extremely high. 
In order to measure credit risk, financial markets use the instrument of CDS (credit default 
swap). A credit default swap is a financial swap agreement that the seller of the CDS, the 
“protection seller”, will compensate the buyer, the “protection buyer”, usually the creditor of 
the reference loan, in the event of a loan default, by the debtor, or other credit event. In other 
words, the seller of the CDS provide to the buyer an insurance against some reference loan 
defaulting. The buyer of the CDS, on the other side, makes a series of payments, known as 
CDS "fee" or "spread", calculated as percentage of notional principal, to the seller and, in 
return, receives a payoff if the loan defaults. In case of default, the CDS’s buyer receives 
compensation, usually the face value of the loan, while the seller of the CDS acquires the 
defaulted loan. [INVESTOPEDIA] 
The negotiation of these instruments takes place in the over the counter markets. Therefore, 
they have a discretional duration, even if they are usually traded for a period of 5 to 10 years 
over the term of the bond. 
On the contrary, sovereign CDSs are distinguished from “normal” CDSs because the 
government bonds of a given country are the object of the contract. For the protection buyer, 
in this case, it is not necessary to hold the bonds of the country. 
The state that issues the bonds is called the reference entity, while the credit events are events 
against which the contract provides protection. They usually are bankruptcy, failure to pay 
coupons or capital shares and the debt restructuring. The occurrence of one of these events 
would trigger the protection seller’s payment to the protection buyer. 
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In Greece’s case, from April to September 2009 sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads 
(calculated on the basis of the relationship between Greek five-year CDS’s premia and Greek 
five-year bond yields, acting as benchmark) were progressively narrowing as taxpayer-funded 
bailout subsidized the risk. Yet, the deterioration of bank debts led to the rise of sovereign risk 
since November 2009, shortly after the election of the new Greek government and the 
revision that more than doubled Greece’s public sector deficit. 
 
 
                         Fig.6: Greece 5Y CDS Spread  
                                        Source: FactSet (2015) 
As a result of the increase in the risk perceived by the market, on 22 April 2010, the closing 
price of 5-years Greek sovereign CDS jumped above 500 bps and its trading status changed to 
upfront, because the CDS buyer had to pay a portion of the insured notional amount in 
addition to the coupon, as the sellers of the CDS were demanding a deposit at the inception to 
cover the country’s increasing credit risk. [ARAKELIAN, V. DELLA PORTAS, P., 
SAVONA, R., VEZZOLI, M. (2015)] In that year, on 27 April, Greek debt was downgraded 
to “junk status” by Standard & Poor's. Consequently, the closing price of 5-years Greek 
sovereign CDS reached almost 1,000 basis points, while the Euro depreciated against the 
major currencies. 
In May 2010, Greece received a €100 billion loan from Member States, while the ECB 
conducted open market operations that led to the acquisition of part of the Greek debt. 
Moreover, on 9 May 2010, the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) was set up in order 
to support Greece and other countries affected by the crisis.  
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After these measures were taken, Greek sovereign CDS spreads, and those of the other 
European states, started to narrow, even if the recovery was only temporary. [LONGO, G. 
(2012)]. 
Indeed, in 2012, when Greece was the “star” of the biggest debt restructuring in modern 
history, 5-yrs Greek sovereign CDS spreads reached almost 2,500 basis points, while in 2013, 
5-yrs Greek sovereign CDS spreads showed a decreasing and irregular trend. The latter can be 
justified by Greece’s inability to comply with the Troika’s conditions and the loss of the 
investors’ confidence. 
Finally, in January 2015, the ECB announced it will restrict the acceptance of Greek 
government and government guaranteed bonds as collateral for ECB operations, essentially 
impeding Greece’s lenders’ access to cheap liquidity. In the same month, the political 
instability made it necessary to resort to early elections. The election was conducted before 
the scheduled date, due to the Greek Parliament’s failure to elect a new president on 
December 2014, and brought to the power the Eurosceptic party Syriza, which based its 
whole election campaign on the renegotiation of the austerity measures that the Troika had 
agreed with the previous government. As a result of the uncertainty concerning Greece’s fate 
and its permanence in the Euro zone, 5-yrs Greek sovereign CDS spreads widened again. 
[MARKIT (2015)] 
The “iron hand” between Syriza and international creditors lasted throughout the first half of 
2015. This deepened the liquidity crisis already in place, ultimately leading to the imposition 
of limits on the movements of capital to prevent bank runs and the rapid depletion of the bank 
deposits. The ECB intervened, providing liquidity of about €89 billion to Greek banks 
through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), in order to contain the liquidity crisis and 
prevent the possibility that the latter would have turned into a solvency crisis.  
However, in this context of extremely high financial and political uncertainty, on 30 June 
2015, the first Greece’s non-payment to the International Monetary Fund occurred. 
Simultaneously, a referendum on the acceptance or the rejection of conditions contained in 
the rescue package proposed by the ECB, European Commission and IMF was held. At that 
period, CDS prices implied that Greek sovereign default would have occurred within five 
years with a 94% probability; moreover, immediately after the call for the referendum credit 
default swap prices increased by 71%, according to data compiled by CMA. [ZIOTIS, P., 
C., CHRYSOLORAS, N., T. (2015)] 
On 5 July 2015, the result of the referendum indicated that the majority of Greek 
people voted to reject the bailout terms (a 61% to 39% decision with 62.5% voter turnout). 
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This caused indexes worldwide to tumble, and 5-yrs Greek sovereign CDS spreads reached 
almost 2,500 basis points, as many were uncertainties about the country's future, fearing 
potential Grexit. [BOURAS, S. (2015)] 
But nonetheless, negotiations between Greece and other Euro zone members kept going in the 
following days to try to procure funds from the ECB in order to determine whether Greece 
should or should not continue to be a member of the European Monetary Union. [FIDLER, S. 
(2015)]
On 13 July 2015, Euro zone leaders agreed on a third bailout package to save Greece from 
bankruptcy. On 14 August 2015, the deal was approved by the Hellenic Parliament. As a 
result of the “weakly recovered” investors’ confidence, 5-yrs Greek sovereign CDS spreads 
started to narrow again. [MARKIT (2015)] 
2.5 The influence of Greece’s debt crisis on the banking sector 
Up to this point, much of the discussion has focused on Greece’s public debt problem, on the 
probability and implications of its sovereign default and on whether the implementation of 
austerity policies have helped or would help pull the country’s economy out of recession. 
Little attention has been paid to the banking sector, that frequently has a key role in the 
evolution of debt and currency crises.  
Concerning Greece’s sovereign debt crisis, what has been required to everyone is agreeing 
upon the reform program and that will be that. This request is sufficiently reasonable, but 
there is one other thing that could happen. The Greek banks could run out of money. This 
situation is known as bank run. It occurs when a huge number of depositors withdraw their 
money simultaneously due to worries about the bank's solvency. More likely as a 
consequence of panic, than as a true insolvency on the part of the banks, many people start to 
withdraw their funds; thus, the probability of default increases, inducing more people to 
withdraw their deposits. In extreme scenarios, this leads to a situation in which the reserves of 
the bank are not enough to cover the withdrawals. 
Moreover, empirical evidences suggest that banking, debt and currency crises often feed into 
each other. [BABECKÝ, J. ET AL (2012)] 
The intuition behind this vicious circle is simple: a sovereign bank-bailout would be 
necessary when concerns about a sovereign default trigger a bank run; the sovereign bank-
bailout could, in turn, trigger the worried sovereign default. 
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In Greece, the fears about a possible exit of the country from the EMU have led savers to 
withdraw almost €5 billion from Greek banks in April 2015. Moreover, deposits by 
households and businesses have fallen to €133.7 billion in April, from €138.6 billion the 
previous month, more than €100 billion below their September 2009 peak, according to the 
Bank of Greece. As reported by the latter, the two-month level of deposit withdrawal has been 
much higher than that recorded in May and June 2012, when the Greek elections led Euro 
area leaders to prepare actively for Grexit. [SPIEGEL, P. (2015)]  
 Fig.7:Running Out of Money: Greek Bank deposits 
       Source: Bank of Greece (2015) 
However, looking to the data relating to June 2015, the situation seems to be even worse. In 
June 2015, what early on seemed to be a slow motion bank run has rapidly turned into a full-
scale bank run. The difficulties in reaching an agreement with the international lenders has 
adversely impacted on the stability of the Greek banking system: on average, almost €500 
million per day have been withdrawn by Greek citizens. As result, the banking deposit level is 
estimated to be €125 billion, versus the pre-crisis level of €240 billion. 
In addition, as above mentioned, on 26 June 2015, just few days before the second economic 
adjustment program’s expiration date and the payment of $1.7 billion to the IMF, Greece’s 
Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras called for a July 5 referendum on the austerity demanded by 
creditors. Euro zone members, suspecting a further play for time, responded by denying to 
extend the EU's “vital financial safety net” beyond the deadline, making Grexit a concrete 
possibility and leading to the rise of national panic. 
On 27 and 28 June 2015, €1.3 billion have been withdrawn from Greek banks. On 29 June 
2015, an anonymous source revealed that, in Greece, only 40 % of ATMs had money in them. 
Meanwhile, on 28 June 2015, the ECB limited the liquidity available to Greek banks, 
provided through the ELA (Emergency Liquidity Assistance); ELA was the only source of 
funding for Greek banks and, thus, the ECB’s decision not to increase the provision of 
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emergency liquidity funding forced the Greek central bank to suggest a bank holiday and 
restrictions on bank withdrawals. [THE ECONOMIC TIMES (2015)] 
Therefore, in view of above, the analysis of Greece’s case, as well as the analogies between 
the latter and Argentina and Uruguay’s situation in the early 2000, provides an opportunity to 
identify which are the dynamics that come into play when a situation of banking panics arises. 
In addition, they help us to understand why restoring the investors’ confidence is a crucial 
condition to ensure the preservation and the proper functioning of the banking system. 
In a crisis situation, macroeconomic risk is more important than bank fundamentals. The first 
can affect depositor behaviours both disregarding and taking into account bank-specific 
characteristics. Its effects take place when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions directly 
jeopardize the value of market participants’ assets.  
Typical examples of direct macroeconomic effects are currency and sovereign risks. 
In the first case, depositors might run away from domestic banks, without considering 
individual bank characteristics, if convertibility to a foreign currency is not possible. In the 
second case, sovereign risk may influence reaction of market participants since it limits the 
capability of the government to insure deposits or the central bank’s capacity to provide 
liquidity assistance to credit institutions experiencing deposit withdrawals, boosting the level 
of bank risk perceived by depositors. Therefore, macroeconomic factors that are mostly 
useless in explaining depositor actions during calm times become the primary drivers of the 
behaviour of market participants in times of crisis, even after checking individual bank 
characteristics. [YEYATI, E., L., PERIA, M., S., M., SCHMUKLER, S. (2010)] 
In the Greek case, the worsening of the economic situation, the continuous political 
instability, the high uncertainty about the Greek government’s ability to reach an agreement 
with international lenders in time to meet forthcoming repayment commitments on marketable 
debt have weakened the investors’ confidence. As result of an increase in the perception of 
the sovereign credit risk, Greece’s government debt was again downgraded to junk status by 
the rating agencies. [UDLAND, M. (2015)] And the downgrading has had different 
implications on the national banking system. 
First, investors have become less inclined to acquire government bonds. Thus, in order to 
finance its public expenditure the government has required the support of the national banks, 
which has taken place through the purchase of government debt securities by the latter. 
The banks, in turn, by increasing their exposures in relation to the sovereign debt, have 
increased their exposures to the macroeconomic risks. 
It all has negatively affected the stability and the soundness of the whole banking system.  
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Therefore, against this background, what has been the policy adopted by the ECB?  
In March 2015, the Governing Council of the ECB, with President Draghi, has sent official 
letters to the Hellenic financial institutions, requiring to those that already held €11 billion of 
Greek government bonds not to buy more. At the same time, the request has been 
accompanied by the prohibition of government to issue new debt, in the form of short-term 
bonds. [IL FATTO QUOTIDIANO (2015)] 
At this stage, it should, however, be noticed that once the run is underway, selective central 
bank assistance and restrictions on cash withdrawals are ineffective. 
Greeks have wisely taken their Euros out of Greek banks and either held cash or taken it 
abroad. So, why restrictions on cash withdrawals have not been previously imposed? And 
how Greek banks have given the depositors Euros without selling all their assets loans and 
Greek government bonds?  
The answer is simple: the Hellenic banks get the money from the Greek central bank, which 
gets Euros from the ECB, that acts as lender of last resort. [DA ROLD, V. (2015)] 
The aim of ELA provision is, indeed, to "prevent or mitigate potential systemic effects as a 
result of contagion through other financial institutions or market infrastructures" and as its 
name implies, ELA is an exception to the rule.  
The rule is that the 19 European central banks, responsible for implementing the ECB’s 
monetary policy, provide liquidity to banks at interest rates fixed by the Council, on the 
condition that the latter post eligible collateral, like government bonds with adequate credit 
ratings. In these operations of standard monetary policy, the risk of any losses is shared by the 
national central banks, proportionally to the size of their economies and populations. But what 
happens if banks are short of eligible collateral? Then they must draw upon ELA. They still 
receive the funding they need, but it is provided by the national central bank at its own risk 
and at a higher interest rate. ELA charges an interest rate, which usually is around 100 to 150 
basis points above the ECB's overnight lending rate at the time. In June 2015, the overnight 
lending rate was – 0,1%. [EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2015)] 
In addition, despite the interested central bank can instigate this support, it has to inform the 
ECB within two working days, while the Governing Council supervises the provision of ELA. 
If the latter decides that such support is at odds with “the objectives and tasks” of the 
Eurosystem, it can limit the ELA provision, as long as a two-thirds majority agree with this 
decision. 
Finally, governments are ultimately responsible for any kind of losses that derive from ELA, 
since they underwrite them. [EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2013)] 
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The decision of the European Central Bank to push the Greek banks into ELA was justified 
by the fact that it has removed a concession allowing the latter to get liquidity in the usual 
way, since they were posting collateral that was already ineligible. That collateral was debt 
issued or guaranteed by the Greek government, that was junk-rated and therefore excluded by 
the ECB’s collateral rules, which require an investment-grade credit rating. [BOETTCHER, 
B., HEINEN, N., STRINGA, M., WALL, M. (2015)] 
This mechanism has, thus, allowed Greek banks, short of eligible collaterals, to obtain the 
liquidity needed to secure the normal banking operations and manage the constant increase in 
the deposit outflows.  
However, it is important to notice that despite the clear benefits, the ELA mechanism has 
some negative implications for the national credit system. 
First, through the ELA, banks can get the funding from the Bank of Greece, instead of 
receiving it from the ECB. Moreover, they post collateral which is more risky than bonds. 
But, in the case in which the loan cannot be paid back, Greece would have to bear the whole 
risk. 
Thus, ELA increases the risk that the Bank of Greece has to face, while makes the ECB and 
the Eurosystem less exposed to a default. 
Moreover, although it hurts Greek banks, which have to pay higher interest rates on their 
central-bank funding, it matters most of all as this mechanism has impacted on the autonomy 
of the Greek banking system. Once banks rely heavily on ELA, the restriction of its use could 
cause the collapse of the whole banking system. 
This is exactly what happened in Ireland when the central bank pushed the country into a bail-
out in the late 2010 by threatening to cut off ELA; [MONASTIRIOTIS, V. (2013)] and this is 
exactly what happened in Greece, where, as mentioned above, the ECB’s refusal to revise 
upward Greek banks’ ELA ceiling has left the latter without the resources that are necessary 
to tackle a situation of growing financial instability. 
Thus, in the light of the above considerations and the steps taken by the European Central 
Bank, are there limits to the amount of emergency liquidity provided by the latter? In a 
normal bank-run, the amount of liquidity provided by a central bank should be unlimited in 
order to allow all depositors to withdraw their money if they want to; thus, the limit for the 
Greek banking system would be the size of all deposits. [WOLFF, G. (2015)]  
Figure 8 shows the deposits in billion and in per cent of total assets. The Greek banking 
system has a deposit base of €125 billion that represents 31% of its total assets, which is €397 
billion. [EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2015)]                          
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Fig.8: Aggregated balance sheet of euro area monetary financial institutions, excluding the Eurosystem: Greece          
        Source: European Central Bank(2015)         
However, would the ECB’s provision of emergency liquidity be enough to prevent a future 
banking crisis? For certain, the strategy implemented by the European Central Bank has 
provided greater stability and liquidity to the Greek banking system, allowing it to slow down 
capital outflows; however, in order to answer this question in a more comprehensible way, 
one needs to take into consideration the macroeconomic risks again. 
If there is certainty that Grexit would not occur and the Hellenic banks would remain solvent 
then the answer is yes. The ECB’s financial support provided to Greek banks by the National 
Central Bank of Greece would give the latter the time and the instruments to tackle and solve 
the temporary liquidity problems. 
On the other side, if the probability that the country would exit from the EMU were high, then 
it would be likely that the banks’ funding stress would lead the latter to sell their assets at fire 
sale in order to meet the demand of withdrawals; and the fire sales could reduce the values of 
the assets so much that the banks would become insolvent. In this case, the ECB would have 
no means to prevent a banking crisis, because under the rules governing ELA procedures, the 
latter is only allowable to banks which are illiquid but solvent.  
On 19 August 2015, international creditors signed with Greece a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) for a new stability support program. This implied that, until 2018, the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) would provide aids to Greece up to a value of €86 
billion. The Greek government would, in return, have to implement reforms envisaged in the 
MoU to solve the country’s serious economic and social problems. Of the new-86-billion-
euro Greece’s aid package made available by European governments, €25 billion would have 
been used for the recapitalization of the country’s credit institutions; [BRUNSDEN, J. (2015)] 
However, in October 2015, the results of “Asset quality reviews”, i.e. the evaluation of banks’ 
assets aimed at estimating the credit risk associated with the latter, and the results of stress 
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tests carried out by the ECB identified a capital shortfall of €4.4 billion in the standard 
scenario; in the adverse scenario, it is equal to €14.4 billion. [EUROPEAN CENTRAL 
BANK (2015)] 
Greek banks’ main problem was the excessive number of non-performing loans, which 
together with the outflow of deposits, increased their risk of insolvency. Three weeks of bank 
holiday and capital controls have, indeed, led Greek small and medium-sized enterprises on 
the brink of the abyss (many of them definitely shut down), causing an increase in the number 
of non-performing loans in Greek banks’ balance sheets. These non-performing loans, that 
already in June 2015 represented one-third of the Hellenic credit institutions’ total claims, in 
September 2015 accounted for around 40% of that amount. The level of non-performing loans 
was, thus, such that a sovereign bank-bail-out should have been combined with a bail-in 
procedure involving bank subordinated bondholders and shareholders. [TIMPONE, G.(2015)] 
However, from 1 January 2016 onwards, in Greece, as well as in the other Member States, a 
new discipline concerning banking sector’s rescuing, known as EU’s Bank Recovery 
Resolution Directive (BRRD), would have come into effect. The latter establishes that, in the 
event of a bank’s insolvency, would be involved in the bank’s losses, in the following order: 
its shareholders, its subordinated and senior bondholders and its unsecured depositors(over 
€100000). In addition, a bail-in of 8% of liabilities (plus complete wiping of equity) would be 
required before the bank could receive ESM and state aid. [DIXON, H. (2016)] 
Therefore, the risk was that depositors, particularly small enterprises, would have to incur in 
losses; this would have wrecked many businesses and intensified the confidence crisis in 
Greece. 
Fortunately, between November and December 2015, Greek banks capital shortfall has been 
completely eliminated thanks to the capital support provided by both the private and the 
public sector. Private investors’ contribution was €4,4 billion, while the remaining €10 billion 
of capital has been injected into the Hellenic credit institutions by the Hellenic public fund, 
the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, which received, in exchange for its support, a 
combination of common shares and contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) in those banks that 
have been recapitalized. [DURAND, H. (2015)]  
Moreover, as a result of the improvement of the liquidity situation of Greece’s banks due to 
the reduction of the uncertainty, the stabilization of the private sector deposit flows and the 
successful implementation of the banks recapitalization process, the provision of emergency 
liquidity assistance to the Hellenic credit institutions fell to €72 billion in January 2016. 
[ANSA (2016)] 
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Thus, Greece succeeded in consolidating, restructuring and stabilizing its banking sector. But, 
despite the successes achieved, additional steps must be taken. Greek banks should improve 
the asset side of their balance sheets if they want to avoid future bail-ins, while the Greek 
government should adopt further measures aimed at strengthening the long-term resilience of 
the country’s banking sector, in order to ensure Greece’s financial stability and avert any 
future possible bank runs; a bank run could, indeed, occur when the temporary administrative 
measures, such as capital controls, will be removed. 
2.5.1 The capital controls and their effects on Greece’s economy 
On 29 June 2015, as mentioned above, Greece announced that banks would be closed for a 
week, controls would be introduced on capital movements and Athens Stock Exchange would 
be shuttered. However, contrary to what was originally and optimistically foreseen, these 
measures were extended from week to week. Greek banks remained closed for about three 
weeks (until 20 July 2015), while the Athens Stock Exchange re-opened only on 3 August, 
after a five-week break. Capital controls, still in place, were relaxed only on two occasions. 
Initially, daily cash withdrawals were limited to €60 as well as ban payments and transfers 
abroad. Greeks could make online transfers within the country and could pay with their cards 
in shops, but they were unable to make online purchases overseas since these would represent 
“currency exports”, that capital controls are designed to prevent. [BBCNEWS (2015)] 
On the other side, for companies, capital controls consisted in waiting for a government 
commission to sign off on large bills owed to foreign enterprises, a process that has slowed 
payments so much that doubtful suppliers began to ask to get paid up front. Moreover, a 
special Committee to Approve Bank Transactions, which dealt with applications for urgent 
and imperative payments that could not be satisfied through the cash withdrawal limits or by 
electronic transactions, was instituted at the State General Accounting Office in cooperation 
with the Finance Ministry, the Bank of Greece, the Union of Greek Banks and the Capital 
Markets Commission. [PETRAKIS, M., N., ROOT, V. (2015)] 
A first relaxation of the controls on capital movements occurred on 24 July 2015 when Bank 
of Greece chief, Yannis Stournaras, loosened restrictions on foreign money transfers, 
allowing banks to green light companies’ foreign payments up to €100,000. This alleviated 
some of the pressures on firms that do business abroad and unblocking imports. [END, A. 
(2015)] In addition, the Greek government adopted a legislative act expanding the daily limit 
of money that could be forwarded abroad per client from €100,000 to €150,000; while the 
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cumulative limit per systemic bank was expanded from €3.4 million per day to €5 million 
(with a proportional adjustment for smaller lenders) and the daily limit that banks committees 
could approve from €15 million to €22 million. The new act also allowed the special 
Committee to Approve Bank Transactions to grant some flexibility to bank committees; in 
this way, the latter could create regional sub-committees on the basis of their geographical 
dispersion and better meet the demands of their clients. Committees authorizing companies’ 
payments to other countries were also instituted in all banks to expedite approvals by the 
central government commission. [KATHIMERINI (2015)]  
However, despite the relaxation of such controls, people remained unable to open new foreign 
bank accounts, buy shares, or transfer large sums of money. Only two main exceptions were 
tolerated: €5,000 per quarter could be sent to the Greek students abroad, while citizens 
receiving medical treatment in other countries could get up to €2,000. [END, A. (2015)] 
The second “relaxation”, instead, occurred on 19 August 2015 when the Greek government 
allowed, for the first time in about two months, to send small amounts of money abroad. 
Specifically, Greek citizens could send up to €500 abroad per person per month, while up to 
€8,000 per quarter could be sent to Greek students studying abroad; Greeks could also open 
new bank accounts, that, however, had no withdrawal rights, in order to repay loans, social 
security contributions or tax debts. [BBCNEWS (2015)] 
Capital controls’ imposition by the Greek government, resulting from the ECB’s decision not 
to increase the provision of emergency liquidity funding to Greek banks, helped to prevent a 
bank run and the collapse of the country’s financial system. But, at this point, the question 
that arises is: how did they impact on Greece’s economy? 
Some estimates indicate that more than the half of small and medium companies, which were 
part of the survey, experienced a significant effect on their businesses as a result of the 
government limitations on cross-border transactions, preventing many from accessing foreign 
services and infrastructures.  
Significant obstacles also arose from the limit imposed on daily cash withdrawals but to a 
smaller scale. Due to the capital controls, 69% of the companies have recorded a significant 
reduction in turnover, while for 18% of these companies the drop has been larger than 50%. 
Only 4% of the companies experienced an increase in their turnover and capital controls had 
no impact on sales of just 27% of the sample companies. The businesses adopted drastic 
measures to reduce the risks in their operations resulting from the reduced bank operations: a 
large number has postponed payments to suppliers (45%) and in fewer cases they have 
delayed payments of salaries; many companies (46%) have used their current accounts 
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opened with foreign banks to settle their trade transactions; few companies (15%) 
performed sales in cash only, while 11% of the companies had to decrease or suspend 
production due to raw material shortages. [ENDEAVOR (2015)] 
These estimates show that capital controls limitedly benefited the economic and financial 
environment. Indeed,  as result of the imposition of controls on capital movements, Greece’s 
GDP contracted 0,5% (while it expanded 0,4% in the second quarter of 2015), while economy 
shrank by 2,3% in the third quarter of 2015. [TUGWELL, P., CHRYSOLORAS, N. (2015)]  
However, it should be noticed that Greek small enterprises are those that have suffered more 
from the imposition of capital controls. On the contrary other sectors of the economy, 
particularly industry, tourism and exports (which increased by 5,6% in the third quarter of 
2015), proved better reliance. Moreover, data related to the same period indicated that 
domestic economic conditions normalized after the initial shock of June. But, this has been 
mainly due to the positive contribute of the export sector and to the fact that the decline in 
consumer expenditures has been lower than expected. [TUGWELL, P., CHRYSOLORAS, N. 
(2015)]   
2.5.2 The tale of Cyprus 
Continuing with the analysis of the effects that the imposition of capital controls could have 
on a country’s economy, a reference must be made to Cyprus’s experience. Cyprus's 
experience is interesting, as it is similar to Greece's one. Therefore, the analysis of Cyprus’ 
case could provide an opportunity for us to identify the possible scenarios that lie ahead for 
Greece. 
On 19 March 2013, the Cypriot Parliament rejected a European bailout programme because of 
the unpopular condition that all depositors, not just big ones, would face conversion of their 
deposits into bank equity as part of a plan to recapitalize the banks. However, the rejection of 
the bailout offer, forced Cyprus to close its banks the day after. In addition, the ECB 
threatened to cut off emergency lending to Cyprus's banks within the week. Therefore, in 
order to avoid a solvency crisis, after six days, the Cypriot government agreed to a 
renegotiated bailout, which put more of the burden on big depositors. [THE ECONOMIST 
(2015)] This led the ECB to withdraw the threat to turn the liquidity taps off, allowing the 
Cypriot banks to re-open two weeks later, but with restrictions on withdrawing cash and 
transferring money abroad.  Depositors’ daily withdrawal was set at €300, while a central 
bank permission was required for any transfer of more than €5,000. A monthly limit of €5,000 
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was imposed on overseas credit card transactions, even if they were unrestricted in Cyprus. 
Taking more than €3,000 out of the country per trip was not allowed. Moreover, company 
could not withdraw more than €500 per day, checks could not be cashed in at the counter and 
inter-bank transfers were limited. [WEAVER, C., STOTHARD, M. (2013)] These restrictions 
were relaxed only after a year, while final caps were lifted in April 2015. [THE 
ECONOMICS (2015)]  
In the present case, as in the case of Greece, the aim of the capital controls legislation was 
allowing the reopening of the country’s banking system without risking that this would have 
led to a bank run. Therefore, knowing Greece and Cyprus’ story as well as the reasons that led 
to introduction of capital controls, a key aspect to be dealt with is: what are the effects of 
capital controls on the economic and banking system? And, in addition, are capital controls 
successful in achieving their objectives? 
The first thing that must be said is that it is difficult to assess the effects of capital controls 
because they are often used by countries whose economy is already under stress, making it 
difficult to distinguish the effects of the controls from other underlying problems. 
What is obvious is that capital controls make life difficult for all sectors, not just banks.  
Evidences from Brazil, but also Greece’s recent experience, show that capital controls 
segment international financial markets, reduce external financing, and lower firm-level 
investment; they disproportionately affect small, non-exporting firms, especially those more 
dependent on external finance. [ALFARO, L. (2014)] 
Moreover, even if capital controls may help countries, limiting the volatility of capital 
inflows, they could also have negative spillover effects on other countries, since they divert 
capital flows to countries that have similar economic characteristics. 
Finally, capital controls appear to be associated with reductions in GDP growth. [ARI, A., 
CORSETTI, G., LYSIOTOU, A. (2015)] 
However, if we considered “other options”, the scenario spreading out would even be worse. 
Indeed, in the absence of capital controls, it is likely that banks would be forced to sell their 
assets at fire sales. But if Cypriot banks had fire sales of assets in order to meet the demand of 
withdrawals, the liquidity problem, in which the banks were simply short of cash in hand, 
would have rapidly turned into an insolvency problem. [THE ECONOMICS (2015)]  
Evidences from Cyprus show that the imposition of controls on capital movements has had a 
relatively successful outcome. Indeed, despite €6.3 billion was withdrawn from the Cypriot 
banks, in April 2013, deposits soon started returning, since foreign investors came back. 
[THE ECONOMICS (2015)] 
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In July 2014, Bank of Cyprus raised €1 billion from foreign investors, while Bank of Greece 
sold more than half of its shares to Belarussian and American companies.  
The real economy also suffered much less damage than expected. Tourism sector suffered 
during the years of the crisis but it has started to recover rapidly in 2015 when tourist arrivals 
have increased by almost 10%; and, despite the financial sector has been severely hit, the 
growth of the country's business-services industry has started to compensate the loss. [THE 
ECONOMICS (2015)] 
But such a strategy relies on confidence returning. On the contrary, although the impact of 
capital controls on Greece’s economy seems to have been more moderate than expected, with 
some sectors experienced a rapid recovery, and the successes achieved in restructuring the 
banking system, the country struggles, differently to what has been possible to observe in 
Cyprus’s case, to restore investors and depositors’ confidence. That is why Greece’s future 
(especially when capital controls will be removed) is likely to differ from Cyprus’ tale. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
POSSIBLE  OUTCOMES OF THE CRISIS: GREXIT OR 
NOT GREXIT? 
 
3.1 The management of the sovereign debt crisis by Greece’s international 
lenders 
3.1.1 Bailout and moral hazard 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the different forms of support from which Greece have 
benefited and will benefit, it is important to understand when a bailout would occur and what 
is the main risk associated to it.  
Corporate and government bailouts occur when money is offered to a failing business or a 
government in order to prevent the consequences from an upcoming downfall. They can take 
different forms: loans, bonds, stocks or cash. In the Greek case, the bailouts have been in the 
form of “cash injections”. They have allowed the Greek government to pay debt interests and 
alleviate the impact of the Great Recession on Greece’s economy. The effects that debt 
bailouts’ have had on the country’s economy will be outlined fully in the next section. 
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that a number of Member States have ever been reluctant to 
provide financial assistance to Greece. These countries have justified their reluctance by 
appealing to the so-called no bailout clause contained in the Maastricht Treaty, which states 
that Member States are not responsible for, and do not have to take on, the commitments or 
debts of any other. [GRAHAM, A., KALYPSO, N. (2011)] However, the real reason behind 
such reluctance is that bailouts could incentive wrong behaviours from Greece and investors. 
This behaviour is known as moral hazard. It occurs when borrowers know that someone else 
will pay for the mistakes they make. This, in turn, gives them incentives to act in a riskier 
way. Moreover, moral hazard usually arises when both the parties have incomplete 
information about each other.  
Therefore, in light of the above, it is possible that Greece, having knowledge that it can count 
on the European Union’s support, may be tempted to require new aid to the international 
lenders, without implementing the necessary reforms to ensure the debt sustainability and 
restore competitiveness. And, bailouts may have a further adverse effect: the latter, by 
implicitly protecting investors from losses, could change their awareness of the risk. This 
usually leads to more excessive investment in risky assets with respect to the case in which 
any insurance of being rescued would have been provided. 
However, Greece’s bailouts differed from traditional bailouts because they did not let 
investors go “scot free” from the crisis. [MUHANZU,  N. (2012)] And therein lies the Greek 
paradox. The bailouts, instead of reducing, appears to have increased investors’ perception of 
risk and thereby their need to focus on borrowers’ creditworthiness. Therefore, Greece’s 
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paradox suggests that the Greek bailouts were the wake-up call, which made investors more 
aware of the risk of lending to country with weak fundamentals. [MUHANZU, N. (2012)] 
 
3.1.2 The debt bailouts and their effects on the Greek  economy 
Greece’s saga started on 2 May 2010, when, after the downgrading of Greece’s government 
debt to junk bond status, the Eurogroup Ministers concurred with the European Commission, 
the ECB and the IMF that market access for Greece was not sufficient and that providing a 
loan was warrant to safeguard the financial stability in the Euro area as whole. [EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2010)] Thus, following a request by the Greek authorities, Euro area 
countries and IMF agreed to a three-year financial aid programme, named First Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Greece.  
The programme provided assistance to Greece totalling up €110 billion. This amount would 
consist of €80 billion bilateral loan commitments provided by the Eurogroup and pooled by 
the European Commission in the Greek Loan Facility (GLF), and additional €30 billion to be 
provided under a Stand-by-Arrangement (SBA) by the IMF. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
(2010)] 
However, the provision of Euro area financial support was conditional on the implementation 
of the austerity measures contained in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), negotiated 
with the Greek authorities by the European Commission, the IMF, in liaison with the ECB. 
These measures aimed at restoring investors’ confidence, stabilizing the fiscal and the 
economic situation and addressing the fiscal and structural challenges of the Greek economy. 
Specifically, the mandatory adoption of such measures had two main objectives: a 5% 
reduction in fiscal deficit by 2010 and driving deficit down to 3% of GDP by the end of 2014. 
[EUROPEAN COMMISSION(2010)] 
The first disbursement took place on 18 May 2010, before the payment obligations of the 
Greek government. Greece received a total amount of €20 billion. Of this total amount, €5,5 
billion came from the International Monetary Fund and €14,5 billion came from the Euro 
states. On 13 September 2010, the second tranche of €6,5 billion was disbursed, while the 
third tranche of the same amount was paid out on 19 January 2011; on 16 March 2011, the 
fourth tranche in the amount of €10,9 billion was disbursed, followed by the fifth instalment 
on 2 July, while the sixth tranche was paid out after months of delay only in early December. 
[EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010)] Of this amount, the IMF provided €2,2 billion. 
[INTERNATIONALER WÄHRUNGSFONDS (2011)]  
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However, contrary to hopes, the situation did not improve. It was originally hoped that 
Greece’s first adjustment programme along with €110 billion aid package would have 
allowed the country to regain capital markets’ access by the end of 2012, but it soon became 
clear that the process would have taken much longer. In the November 2010 revisions of the 
2009 deficit and debt levels, Greek second-quarter GDP growth was revised down to a 1,8% 
fall from the first three months, compared with the estimate of 1,5% decline. In the same 
period, the Greek economy shrank by 3,7% versus an initial estimate of 3,5% and the 
deepening of the recession caused a 18,6% fall in the gross investments in fixed assets. 
[SKREKAS, N. (2010)] Total consumption dropped by 5,1%, while imports dropped by 
13,5% and exports were down by 5%. [SKREKAS, N. (2010)]   
Similar trends were also observed in the third and in the fourth quarter. [EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2011)] 
Moreover, due to severe economic crisis, tax revenues were lower than expected, making it 
even more difficult for Greece to achieve its fiscal targets. [TRAYNOR, I. (2011)] 
Thus, a number of agreements were signed by Greece and international lenders in order to 
offer the country both more time and money to restore the economy. 
Nevertheless, the country’s economic and financial situation remained fragile. The austerity 
measures have helped Greece to reduce its primary deficit before interest payments, but as a 
side-effect they have also contributed to a worsening of the Greek recession: in 2011, Greek 
GDP declined by 7,1%, while the unemployment rate rose to 17,7% as result of the increase 
in the number of Greek companies going bankrupt. [EURONEWS (2011)] 
Therefore, on 21 February 2012, the Eurogroup finalized the second bailout package. 
Greece’s second rescue was valued €130 billion. The Eurogroup of financial ministers stated 
that “ensuring debt sustainability and restoring competitiveness” were the objectives of this 
second bailout. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012)] 
In order to reach the goals established in the agreement, private sector bondholders were 
invited to accept a 53,5% reduction in the face value of their Greek IOUs and a reduction in 
the interest rate carried by their replacement bonds (the replacement bonds were bonds issued 
under English law, therefore, it would be impossible for Greece to unilaterally modify the 
terms of the bonds), while creditors were invited to swap their Greek bonds into new 3,65% 
bonds, even in this case subject to English law, with maturity of 30 years. This would have 
equated to a debt write-off of about €110 billion, if all private bondholders have accepted the 
swap. [MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2012)] 
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On 9 March 2012, Evangelos Venizelos, Greece’s Minister of Finance, announced that “the 
country had received tenders for exchange and consents from private holders of Greek 
government bonds regulated by Greek law of approximately €152 billion face amount of 
bonds, representing 85,8% of the outstanding face amount of bonds”. [MINISTRY OF 
FINANCE (2012)] Since this number was above the 66,7% threshold, it allowed Greece to 
activate the Collective Action Clauses (CAC) so that the remaining 14,2% was also obliged to 
agree. Moreover, “the Hellenic Republic also received tenders for exchange and consents 
from holders of approximately €20 billion aggregate face amount, or 69%, of its bonds issued 
under laws other than Greek law”.1[MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2012)] 
On 10 March 2012, after these results have been announced, the president of the Eurogroup 
stated that Greece had also satisfied the last of the conditions for the activation of the next 
bailout package. [BBCNEWS (2012)] 
The other conditions to be met were: achieving a realistic fiscal consolidation, carrying out 
fully the privatization plants and implementing the bold structural agenda, in both the labour 
market and product and service markets. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012)] 
However, since the debt restructuring had caused significant economic losses to private 
bondholders, Fitch Ratings downgraded Greece’s government bonds to “RD” (Restrict 
Default) from “C”. [REUTERS (2012)] At the same time, ISA (International Swap and 
derivative Association) classified the deal as a “credit event”, triggering €3,5 billion of credit 
default swaps (CDSs) on Greek debt. [BBCNEWS (2012)] 
On 14 March 2012, the Eurogroup approved the Second Adjustment Programme for Greece. 
The Euro area Member States and the IMF undertook to disburse the undisbursed amounts of 
the first programme plus an additional €130 billion for the years 2012-2014. Whilst the first 
programme was financed through bilateral loans, it was concurred that on Euro area Member 
States’ side, the second programme would have been funded by the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), which had been active since August 2010. [EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2012)] 
1 The holders of a Swiss-law sovereign bond received only a consent solicitation (The process by which 
an issuer proposes changes to the bond terms, without this proposal representing an offer itself), not an exchange 
offer, apparently because the latter would have been too difficult, given local securities regulations, within the 
short period envisaged. Holders of Japanese-law bonds, an Italian-law bond, and Greek-law guaranteed bonds 
received the opposite treatment, i.e. only exchange offers (an exchange offer is a form of tender offer, in which 
bonds with different terms are offered as consideration instead of cash. Such exchange offers typically require 
the consent of holders of some minimum portion of the total outstanding debt, often in excess of 90%, because, 
unless the terms of the bond provide otherwise, non-consenting bondholders will retain their legal right to 
demand repayment of their bonds at par), but not consent solicitation. 
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In total the second programme foresaw financial assistance of €164,5 billion until the end of 
2014. Of this amount, the Euro area commitments amounted to €144,7 billion, while the IMF 
contributed €19,8 billion. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012)] 
The first instalment of €39,4 billion was disbursed by the EFSF in March 2012. [REUTERS 
(2012)] 
However, continued political instability led, in June 2012, to parliamentary elections that 
created a very tense environment and resulted in the formation of a coalition government 
which quickly took steps to comply with the Memorandum of Understanding’s requests; but 
the difficulty to fulfil the conditionality in the immediate aftermath of the elections 
significantly delayed the disbursement of the next tranches of loans from the international 
lenders. This negatively affected Greece’s economic and financial situation. Thus, against this 
background, on 26-27 November 2012 the Eurogroup and the IMF agreed to extend the 
duration of the fiscal adjustment programme. The programme’s new expiry date was 28 
February 2015. [FINANCIAL TIMES (2012)] 
Meanwhile, Greece informed international lenders that it was considering certain debt relief 
measures, debt buy-back operations, that would have been realized through political debt 
tender purchases of different classes of sovereign obligations. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
(2015)] 
On 12 December 2012, after the finalisation of the national procedures and the revision of the 
outcome of the debt buy-back operations conducted by Greece, the Member States authorised 
the EFSF to release the second instalment for a total amount of €49,1 billion paid in several 
tranches. The first tranche of €43,3 billion was paid out to Greece in September 2012, while 
the second was disbursed in the first quarter of 2013; the next tranches of €2 billion, €2,8 
billion, €2,8 billion have been paid on 31 January 2013, 28 February 2013 and 3 May 2013, 
respectively. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013)]  
In May 2013, when the second review of the Second Adjustment Programme was concluded, 
the Eurogroup approved the third instalment which was disbursed in two sub-tranches; the 
first, of €4,2 billion was paid on 17 May 2013, while the second, worth €3,3 billion, was 
disbursed on 25 June 2013. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013)] 
The fourth instalment of €5 billion was approved in July 2013. It was disbursed on 26 July 
2013 and on 17 December 2013. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013)] 
On April 2014, the Eurogroup mandated the EFSF Board of Directors to approve the fifth 
EFSF instalment of €8,3 billion, which had to be paid out to Greece in three sub-tranches: 
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€6,3 billion, €1 billion and €1 billion were respectively disbursed on May 2014, July 2014 
and December 2014. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014)] 
As mentioned above, the Second Economic Adjustment Programme would have been ended 
on 28 February 2015. However, Greece’s economic situation had not improved. Between 
2012 and 2015 the average income decreased by one-third; while, in 2015, the unemployment 
rate was just below 26% and the debt ratio reached 177% of GDP. [EUROSTAT (2015)] 
Therefore, in February 2015, after Syriza’s election victory, the Eurogroup agreed to extent 
Greece’s financial assistance programme by four months. Under the new deal, the Hellenic 
Republic would have received € 7,2 billion; however, this disbursement was conditional on 
the country’s implementation of measures such as privatizations, cuts in public spending and 
reform of its tax system. The list of reforms to be carried out by the Greek government in 
order to obtain this funding would have been subject to the final approval of international 
creditors at the end of April 2015. [EUROPEAN COUNCIL (2015)] But, negotiations 
between Greece and international lenders immediately turned into a long “tug of war”, that 
only ended in July 2015, when the EU Council granted Greece, which was facing an acute 
liquidity crisis, a three-month bridge-loan of €7,16 billion that was disbursed under the EFSM 
on 20 July 2015. [EUROPEAN COUNCIL (2015)]   
The three-month loan of €7,16 billion was intended to allow the Greek government to make a 
4,2 billion euro payment to the ECB on government bond maturing in July, purchased by the 
latter during 2010-11 under the Security Market Programme (SMP), and a 2 billion euro 
payment to the IMF to cover the June 2015 arrears. [CHREPA, E. AT AL (2015)] In 
exchange for the loan, the Greek government was required to implement the measures 
outlined in section 3.3 as well as measures aimed at ensuring the full legal independence of 
the National Institute of Statistics, EL.STAT; moreover, it had to fully implement the budget 
rules established in Article 3 of Fiscal Compact, reform of the code of civil procedure, 
transpose the EU Directive on bank resolution (2014/59/EU). [EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
(2015)] 
After the successful implementation of these reforms by the Hellenic parliament, the 
Eurogroup, on 17 July 2015, mandated the European Commission to initiate negotiations on a 
third bailout programme for Greece of up to €86 billion for a period of three years (2015-
2018). In return for this financial assistance, Greece would have had to reform its pension 
system, liberalize product and labour  markets, privatize the electricity transmission network 
operator (ADMIE), adopt necessary steps to strengthen the financial sector and a modernize 
public administration. In addition to these reforms, the country has been required to start a 
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huge privatisation plan. Under the plan, valuable public assets would have been transferred to 
an independent fund, situated in Greece and managed by the Greek authorities under the 
supervision of the “relevant European institutions”, which would have, in turn,  monetized 
these assets through privatisations and other operations. Proceeds from the privatisation 
(around €50 billion) would have been used to repay the ESM (€25 billion), to reduce Greece’s 
public debt (€12,5 billion) and make new investments (€12,5 billion). [EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2015)] 
Finally, in order to contribute to Greece’s economic growth and job creation, the European 
Commission presented a Job and Growth Plan for Greece on 15 July 2015. Under this plan, 
about €35 billion from EU funds would be disbursed by 2020. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
(2015)] 
On 14 August 2015, the Hellenic parliament approved the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU), while on 19 August 2015, the European Commission signed the MoU with Greece. 
The third economic adjustment programme for Greece officially started on that day. The first 
installment, worth €16 billion, was approved by the Eurogroup in August 2015 and disbursed 
in three sub-tranches. The first, of €13 billion, was paid on 20 August 2015. The Hellenic 
government used a substantial part of this amount to make a 3,2 billion euro bond payment to 
the ECB. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015)] 
The disbursement of the second sub-tranche occurred on 23 November 2015, after Greece’s 
completion of the first list of reforms agreed with the international lenders, namely the 
finalization of a comprehensive strategy for strengthening the financial system, the 
development of a medium-term technical assistance plan with the European Commission, the 
implementation by the Bank of Greece of the Code of Conduct (which regulates the 
relationships between banks and borrowers), the introduction of a criminal law on tax evasion 
and fraud, the development of a plan for the facilitation of electronic payments with the Bank 
of Greece and private sector, the raise of the retirement age and health care contributions, the 
abolition of most of early retirement benefits, the implementation of a gas market reform and 
the establishment of the privatization fund. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015)] 
The last sub-tranche, worth €1 billion, has, instead, been disbursed on 22 December 2015 
after Greece’s completion of the second set of measures agreed with the international lenders. 
[AGI (2015)] This second set of measures included the privatization of electricity 
transmission company (ADMIE), the definition of a plan for the new established privatization 
fund, the adoption of measures for cross-checking registration of fuel storage tanks to combat 
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fuel smuggling and the implementation of reforms to improve the efficiency in the 
transportation sector. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015)] 
Therefore, after having considered the “road walked” by the EU and the IMF in order to avoid 
Greece’s default, what remains to be done is analysing how bailouts have affected Greece’s 
economy. This begs the question: has the adopted strategy worked out? 
According to a Financial Times’ article, Five year on, Doctor and Patient split on Greek cure, 
Greece and its creditors agree that the bailouts have not worked as hoped. On the contrary, 
they have caused a drop in disposable incomes (between 2010 and 2015, disposable income 
per capita has dropped by 27.5%) and an increase in the unemployment rate, which in 2015, 
as previously stated, was slightly lower than 26%. Moreover, between 2010 and 2015, GDP 
fell by 25%, while the debt-to-GDP increased by about 21%. 
There are two possible explanations for this failure. 
The first is the lenders’ version. According to the latter, the bailouts’ program was and 
remains correct, but Greece failed in implementing it. The country had lost control of its 
budget and therefore the only way to solve its problem was through fast deficit-cuttings. The 
austerity measures imposed by the Troika were the only way to restore Greece’s 
competitiveness and investors’ confidence and support growth. 
On the other side, most economists say that the bailouts’ program always presented three 
weaknesses. 
Firstly, the excessive degree of austerity that has effectively limited the economic recovery 
and growth. In a model where public expenditure is the mainstay of the economy, if the state 
stops spending and the citizens remain without money, business activity and consumption will 
be drastically reduced. 
The IMF admitted that “it made notable failures on the rescue packages for Greece, setting 
overly optimistic expectations for the country’s economy and underestimating the effects of 
the austerity measures it imposed”. [SPIEGELONLINE (2013)] The rescue packages have 
allowed to keep Greece alive, but it came in return for hard austerity measures that have 
accentuated the state's recession. 
Moreover, as Kyriakos Mitsotakis argued, the sequence of measures was not correct. 
[FINANCIAL TIMES (2015)] By initially focusing on labour market rather than product 
market, structural reforms have led to a sharp decline in nominal wages that has not been 
accompanied by a fall in prices. The significant cut in real wages has further depressed 
demand, while Greece’s competitiveness and foreign demand have not grown as would have 
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been necessary. The result has been an increase in inequality that has undermined the 
consensus for market-oriented reforms. 
Finally, the way in which reforms were structured. Most of the enacted reforms were not the 
ones Greece most needed, but rather the result of application of a standard international 
formula. 
 
3.1.3 The crisis management tools 
The failure of Greece’s bailouts’ program may also be the result of an inefficient and delayed 
response provided by the European Community to the country’s problem. However, it should 
be noticed that when the crisis broke out in Greece, in 2009, the EU and the ECB were 
completely unprepared for dealing promptly and properly with the default risks and a crisis of 
this nature, especially because of the lack of a specific crisis management mechanism. 
In addition, as already mentioned, the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union) contains articles, namely Articles 123, 124 and 125, that expressly prohibit 
concessionary credit facilities, privileged access to financial institutions and bailouts. 
Nevertheless, for countries in economic difficulties, the same Treaty establishes, in Article 
143, a mechanism of financial assistance to be activated if a Member State is in difficulties or 
is seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments. Therefore, in this 
case, the use of bilateral loans or agreements with other international organizations is not 
excluded. 
It is precisely these tools that the European governance has deployed in May 2010 when the 
Intercreditor Agreement and the Loan Facility Agreement were signed between the 
Eurogroup, the European Commission and the Greek government. They are 
intergovernmental agreements establishing a series of bilateral loans between Member States 
at interest rates close to market rates; they are coordinated by the European Commission, and 
combined with IMF’s measures. [EURO AREA LOAN FACILITY ACT (2010)] 
Alongside these intergovernmental agreements, a temporary crisis resolution mechanism was 
established by the Council Regulation N° 407/2010, the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM). It is an emergency funding programme, subjected to the European 
Commission’s supervision, that relies on the funds collected in the financial markets and 
guaranteed by the European Commission using, as collateral, the budget of the EU.  
The establishment of this Facility does not conflict with the no bailout clause since the latter 
limits itself to grant financial assistance to the State in difficulty without the responsibility for 
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the debts of the ailing State being directly assumed by other Member States or the European 
Union. [EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010)]  
The lending capacity of the EFSM is, though, limited to €60 billion; an inadequate amount to 
deal with the scale of the current crisis. Therefore, in order to overcome this limitation, the 
EFSM has been accompanied by a second multilateral instrument, the EFSF (European 
Financial Stability Facility), established during the ECOFIN Council of June 2010. The latter 
has a total subscribed capital of €780 billion, provided by Euro area Member States in portion 
to their share in the paid-up capital of the ECB, which offers a lending capacity for the EFSF 
of €440 billion. [EFSF (2010)]  
The two facilities work together, providing financial assistance up to a maximum of €500 
billion; but, this provision was and is linked to a strict conditionality principle, defined in the 
Memorandum of Understanding that the State requesting assistance negotiates with the 
European Commission, responsible for the implementation of the Facility and guarantor of its 
proper functioning, the ECB and IMF. [EFSF (2010)] 
As past experiences show, the combined action of the EFSM and the EFSF has helped to 
mitigate the effects of the crisis in Ireland, Portugal and Greece, but it has been purely on an 
emergency basis; however, given the systemic nature of the crisis, the demand for a 
permanent mechanism to be applicable in case of need was increasingly made manifest. 
[EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2011)] In addition, the legal basis of these mechanisms was 
rather fragile and easily questionable. 
These difficulties were also perceived by the rating agencies and the markets that, sensitive to 
the expectations associated with each hypothetical change, did not seem to consider the two 
facilities as “solvers” of the sovereign debt crisis. [EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2011)] 
Therefore, once the effects of the crisis were contained, the European institutions have turned 
their attention to the search for a more stable and efficient mechanism. The “research” ended 
on 2 February 2012 when the Treaty setting up the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was 
ratified by all Euro area Member States, after the European Council decision amending 
Article 136 of TFEU in order to authorize the establishment of this mechanism under EU law.  
The ESM is an intergovernmental institution based in Luxembourg, with a total capital 
(subscribed by Euro area Member States in portion to their share in the paid-up capital of the 
ECB) of €700 billion (€80 billion as paid-in capital while €620 billion as callable capital). It 
has been designed to provide financial assistance to EU Member States that experience acute 
funding problems. To do this, the ESM has four instruments, the same as the EFSF, but, 
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differently from the latter, it can also purchase government bonds, issued by the State in 
difficulty, on both the primary and the secondary market. 
In order to gain the support by the ESM, Member States must submit to the Chairman of the 
Board of Governors a request, specifying the financial instrument that they want to be 
applied. This, in turn, taking into account the European Commission and the ECB’s 
evaluation of whether there is a situation of financial and economic emergency, decides 
whether or not to grant financial assistance, which even in this case is provided under strict 
economic policy conditionality. 
Moreover, as of 1 March 2013, Member States must also have ratified the so-called “Fiscal 
Compact”, i.e. the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, in order to be qualified for receiving ESM assistance and they have to 
satisfy an additional condition, i.e. the timely transposition of the balanced budget rule in their 
national legislation. [ESM (2012)] 
Finally, the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF will monitor compliance with 
economic conditionality by the beneficiary State, making the disbursement of the next 
assistance tranches subordinated to the achievement of good results. [ESM (2012)] 
The various mechanisms described so far, represent an important step in the process of 
European integration. Their use has allowed to stem and cushion the effects of the sovereign 
debt crisis and the contagion risk in the various EU Member States. However, further 
progresses must be made. 
The problem is that the ESFS and the ESM have not the necessary credibility to stop the 
forces of contagion; indeed, differently from a central bank which can create unlimited 
amount of cash, they cannot guarantee that the cash will always be available to pay out 
sovereign bondholders. [GRAUWE, D. (2011)] Moreover, they have a governance structure 
that makes them poorly suited for managing a crisis because each country maintains a veto 
power and, as a result, their decisions will be constantly questioned by local political 
concerns.  
Last but not least, the funds can only operate under necessity and extreme urgency conditions. 
Their action is not implemented in pre-tension situations, which would be more manageable 
and less costly, but it is only allowed when the situation deteriorates, in other words when the 
State would have difficulties in finding finance in a traditional way. 
On the contrary, the process of integration among States that share the same currency should 
focus on the introduction of ordered public debt management instruments in order to create a 
European debt market.  
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3.1.4 The unconventional monetary policy adopted by the European Central 
Bank 
Despite the fact that the rescue programmes have not worked as hoped, it should, however, be 
noticed that among the international institutions, the ECB is the one that has been able to 
handle the financial and economic emergency in the most efficient way, using every possible 
means at its disposal to ensure the survival of the monetary union. The role played by the 
latter has, indeed, been crucial in both preventing the increase in Euro area government bond 
spreads up to unsustainable levels and tackling the liquidity crisis which has hit European 
credit institutions and that, in Greece’s case, was likely to turn into an insolvency crisis. These 
are actually two interlinked situations, as banks are the main buyers of government debt 
securities. 
In the crisis framework, the ECB’s intervention has took place through the adoption of a 
series of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments. Among the 
indirect support measures, there are programs for the provision of Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (ELA) to the Euro area credit institutions, programs for the purchase of covered 
bonds on both primary and secondary markets by the national central banks, the three 
Covered Bond Purchase Programmes (CBPPs), launched in 2009, 2011 and 2014 
respectively, and the Securities Market Programme (SMP), launched in May 2010 and 
replaced in 2012 by the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT),which has not been activated 
yet. 
While the CBPPs’ objective was stabilizing the market for covered bonds and therefore 
helping to resolve banks’ refinancing problems, the SMP was designed to replicate the 
liquidity-providing effects of conventional monetary policy by influencing expected short-
term interest rates, and in particular, to enhance the liquidity in the government bond market. 
[CLAEYS, G. (2014)]  
Under the SMP, the European Central Bank purchased, between May and June 2010, 
approximately €43 billion of Greek bonds (at market prices) which is 17% of the total Greek 
bond market in 2010, traded on secondary markets, on standard platforms, such as 
Bloomberg. The ECB focused on large, relatively liquid benchmark bonds, with high yields 
and with shorter and medium maturities. The average maturity of Greek ECB portfolio was 
5,4 years. Moreover, it only bought Greek law bonds, while it did not purchase sovereign 
bonds issued under English, Italian and Japanese law, despite the fact that the latter accounted 
for 7,4% of the total amount outstanding. [TREBESCH, C., ZETTELMEYER, J. (2014)] 
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The implementation of SMP programme significantly affected the Greek government bond 
market. It has been estimated that the total decline in Greek government bond yields 
attributable to the ECB purchases was between 180 and 200 basis points, and these effects 
were particularly pronounced at the short end of the yield curve, years 1 to 5. [DE POOTER, 
M., ET AL (2015)]  
Moreover, immediately after launch of the SMP, the yield curve turned from downward 
sloping (indicating high risk of default) to “well-behaved” (upward sloping and concave); this 
shift was mainly pronounced in the maturity segments in which the ECB intervened most, 
namely in the short and medium term. [DE POOTER, M., ET AL (2015)]  
 
 
             Fig.9: The Greek bond yield curve 
       Source: JP Morgan (2015) 
On the other hand, the implementation of the Covered Bond Purchase Programmes led, 
between 2011 and 2012, to a huge increase in the number of  Greek credit institutions that 
turned to the covered bond products as a funding instrument. This, in turn, allowed to increase 
primary market activity and revitalized, at least on a temporary basis, the segments of 
Greece’s financial sector that were particularly affected by the crisis. These developments 
substantially improved the country’s  overall funding situation in Euro and relieved some of 
the pressures on its banks to rely on the ECB’s liquidity providing operations. The raise in the 
primary supply of covered bonds was also accompanied by a very rapid tightening of covered 
bond spread in the secondary market and a narrowing of bid-offer spread. [BEIRNE, J. 
(2011)] [EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2012)] 
ELA, CBPPs and SMP were not the only non-standard instruments used by the ECB. Indeed, 
to pursue its unconventional monetary policy, it resorted to other two types of non-standard 
operations, the long-term refinancing operations that were carried out in December 2011 and 
February 2012 (LTROs) and targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) adopted at 
the end of 2014.  
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As well as the Securities Market Programme also the long-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs) were aimed at lowering government bonds yields. In fact, during the most intensive 
period of European financial crisis, Greece and other peripheral countries (Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland) saw large increase in their government bond yields. Italian and Spanish 
yields peaked around 7% in 2011, while Portuguese and Irish yields peaked around 20%; 
Greek two-year yield rose about 200% prior to Greek default in 2012. [KRISHNAMURTHY, 
A. ET AL (2014)] 
However, differently from the previous programme, these measures, which included long-
term refinancing of banks and an increase in the availability of collateral, “indirectly focused” 
on government bond market. The ECB believed that loan extensions to banks would 
encourage the latter to purchase government bonds, therefore helping lowering sovereign 
bond yields, and increase the lending to Euro area SMEs. On the other hand, the increase in 
the availability of collateral, realized by the ECB through measures embracing a lower rating 
threshold on ABS (Asset backed securities) eligible as collateral from AAA to A-, accepting 
non-traded bank debt to be employed as collateral and endowing national central banks with 
sufficient discretion to approve ancillary credit claims at their own peril, mainly reflected the 
central bank’s willingness to ensure that Greek banks would still be able to obtain its funds by 
using Greek government bonds as a guarantee or providing other securities as collateral. 
[BELKE, A. (2012)] 
But despite this, Greece participation in both December and February LTRO was limited. 
Greek banks borrowed only €60 billion during the first long-term refinancing operation, while 
the Greek sovereign debt’s downgrading to “selective default” by Standard & Poor’s, in 2012, 
and the subsequent ECB’s suspension of the eligibility of Hellenic Republic debt or debt 
instruments reduced the ability of the Greek banks to participate in February LTRO. 
[ROONEY, B. (2012)] [GANDY, B., LONGSDON, S. (2012)] These latter events 
significantly limited the potential impact that carry trade would have had on Greek 
government bond yields. 
Indeed, as previously stated, the ECB provided cheap loans to European banks hoping that the 
latter would have used these funds to purchase sovereign debt of their home nations, therefore 
helping to lower government bond yields. But, while in the Italian and Spanish case, some 
banks used the funds obtained under the first long-term refinancing operation to buy 
sovereign bonds and then offered them as collateral during the second LTRO, in the Greek 
case, due to the ineligibility of the Greek bonds, banks sought other securities to be provided 
as collateral. 
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Thus, as a result of the different economic and political conditions of the different Member 
States, the measure adopted by the ECB had a dissimilar effect within the Euro zone. They led 
to substantial recovery in Italy, Spain and Ireland, while they did not improve the state of 
Portugal and Greece, which sovereign bond yields continued to rise. [KRISHNAMURTHY, 
A. ET AL (2014)] 
In addition, the LTROs failed in achieving the ultimate goal of a positive impact on the real 
economy, especially in Greece where banks, due to huge holes they had in their balance 
sheets, used the money they received from the ECB to compensate losses on subprime and 
other bad loans rather than for new loans to the real economy. 
Conversely, the ECB’s TLTRO programme launched in 2014 appears to have been more 
successful.  
In order to assess whether TLTROs improved the financial conditions in the Euro zone and to 
explore the relationship between the latter and real economic activity in the Euro area as a 
whole and for Greece in particular, Balfoussia and Gibson constructed a regression model. 2 
The results of the analysis are that the improvements in the financial conditions, due to 
TLTRO allocation of the Eurosystem, have had sizeable effects on the real economy, namely 
a 5,7%, 2,9% and 4,7% cumulative increase of Industrial Production, Retail trade and the 
Purchasing managers’ index for the Euro area and a 0,9%, 6,6% and 2,9% cumulative 
increase of the corresponding variables in the case of Greece. [BALFOUSSIA, H., GIBSON, 
H., D. (2015)] 
Finally, in March 2015, the ECB adopted its “last non-standard measure”, the Public Sector 
Purchase Programme (PSPP). Even in this case, Greek government bonds were excluded due 
to the fact that the country’s sovereign debt was below investment grade; [DRAGHI, M. 
2 In  the regression model, the explanatory variable is the financial conditions index (FCI), which summarize and 
track the evolution of financial conditions over time and which is constructed by applying principal components 
analysis on a wide range of prices, quantities, spreads and survey data, while the dependent variable is a 
combination of three real variables, namely the industrial production (IP), the volume of retail trade (RRT) and 
the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI). The first two variables capture the consumption and investment 
components of real activity, while the third is a well-known leading indicator of GDP growth. 
In the model, Balfoussia and Gibson assumed that the full amount of liquidity allotted to euro-area banks during 
the TLTRO rounds is directly channeled towards loans to the private sector. This positive one off shock to credit 
supply is then inputted into the corresponding FCI components, using the loadings on loan flows to non-financial 
corporations and households in each of the principle components and the weight of each principle component in 
the FCI, and the implied positive shock to the FCI, i.e. to financial conditions, is thus calculated.  
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(2015)] but, despite such exclusion, the program may have an indirect impact on Greece’s 
economy. Indeed, an expansionary monetary policy, like the one conducted by the ECB 
through the quantitative easing programme, causes a fall in the exchange rate; and as Greece’s 
economy is penalized by having a strong currency, a devaluation of the latter could benefit the 
country in terms of competitiveness. A depreciation of the Euro against the currencies of its 
trading partners outside the Euro area would make the country’s production more competitive, 
and this, in turn, would lead to an increase in the exports. As a result, the profits of exporting 
companies would rise; and it all would have a positive impact on the current account of the 
balance of payments. 
All the measures described so far, together with a substantial reduction in interest rates to a 
record level of 0,05 %, have helped to improve conditions in the interbank market and favored 
a drop in the government bond yields. [EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2015)] 
However, as it has been possible to see, their impact on the real economy has been limited. 
Indeed, despite this unconventional approach adopted by the ECB has played a key role in 
avoiding further declines in output in the countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis, 
it has failed to stimulate an increase in bank lending to the private sector and consequently to 
aid economic recovery; moreover, even the degree of effectiveness of such measures in 
stimulating growth in consumption and investments, although varying from one country to 
another, has been low. [INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2013)] 
 
3.2 The hypothesis of a new debt restructuring                                                    
On 30 July 2015, the IMF said that “it would not take part in Greece’s third bailout until 
explicit and concrete agreement on debt relief from the country’s Euro zone creditors will be 
reached”. [STEWART, H. (2015)] Indeed, under the IMF rules, in order to obtain a loan, a 
country must show that its debt is sustainable over the medium term, three to five years, with 
“high probability”. This means that there is a high probability for the lenders to be repaid 
since the country will be able to access again to market and therefore finance its debt and pay 
back official creditors. 
However, in the case of Greece, the results of the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis (DSA) 
published on 26 June 2015 and on 14 July 2015, indicated that Greece’s public debt is not 
sustainable over the medium and long-term, with high probability. [MONTANINO, A.(2015)] 
A comparison of the results of the three latest performed DSAs indicates a significant 
deterioration of the country’s debt profile. Figure 10 highlights the ratio of debt to GDP under 
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the three DSAs for 2017 and 2022. While in 2014, the debt to GDP ratio for 2017 was 
estimated to be just above 150%, the latest estimates show a higher value, at 200%. This is 
due to the deterioration in expectations for growth and a lower than expected primary surplus. 
Interestingly, assuming that GDP and primary surplus would grow at the same rate, the debt 
to GDP ratio’s value forecasted for 2017 increases by 30%. [INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND (2015)]  
   
             Fig.10: Debt-to-GDP ratio 
                   Source: International Monetary Fund(2015) 
However, the unsustainability of the Greek debt over the medium-long run was known before 
the IMF published the results of its analysis. 
The Greek government has long argued that a debt relief had to be granted to Greece under 
the new rescue programme. To this end, on 26 June 2015, the government presented its own 
restructuring plan that would have allowed the latter to cut its huge debt load from the current 
180% of GDP to just 93% by 2020. The restructuring plan was ambitious, offering ways to 
reduce the amount of debt held by all four of its public-sector creditors: the ECB, which held 
€27 billion in Greek bonds; the IMF, which was owed about €20 billion from bailout loans; 
individual Euro zone Member States, which banded together to make €53 billion bilateral 
loans to Athens as part of its first bailout; and the Euro zone’s bailout fund, the EFSF, which 
picked up the EU’s €144 billion in the second bailout programme. [SPIEGEL, P. (2015)] 
The proposal for the ECB holdings was the following: the ESM would have lent to Greece 
€27 billion, that the latter would have then used to repay the bonds held by the ECB. The 
loans of the ESM are at longer maturities and lower interest rates compared to Greece’s bonds 
held by the ECB, therefore it would have been a restructuring of the debt without a real debt 
restructuring. Moreover, the €27 billion owed to the ECB due to its bond holdings included 
€9 billion in profits. The Greek plan was to use this amount to repay nearly half of its 
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outstanding obligations to the IMF early, while the rest would have been paid by either raising 
funds on the market or using new bailout loans.  
The proposal to Euro zone Member States was double. The first idea was a so-called 
“perpetual bond”: a loan to Greece which would have been never repaid in full, but would 
have had forever-lasting interest payments of 2-2,5% of the value of the bond; the other 
possibility was “GDP indexed bonds”: in this case, Greece would only have had to make 
payments to creditors if its economy would have started growing again, and in amounts tied to 
the rate of growth. [SPIEGEL, P. (2015)] 
Finally, the Greek government would have divided the EFSF loans in two parts, with part of 
the outstanding debt being restructured into a loan paying 5% interest, double the 2,5% 
currently paid, and the remaining part essentially being written off. In this view, annual 
interests paid by Greece would have remained unchanged but Greece’s overall debt burden 
would have been significantly cut. The debt write-off would have been realized in phases 
under the Greek plan; firstly it would have become a zero-coupon bond, which would have 
been gradually cancelled. 
According to Greek government’s estimates, if all the elements of the presented plan have 
been adopted, the country’s debt would have been back under 60% of GDP by 2030. 
[GREEK GOVERNMENT (2015)]
 
 
   Fig. 11: Greek government’s debt sustainability analysis  
    Source: Greek government (2015) 
However, the restructuring plan was rejected by the international lenders as incomplete and 
difficult to implement. Moreover, its realization would have led to huge losses to the Euro 
zone Member States. Nevertheless, the refusal was about the content of the debt restructuring; 
also international lenders agreed that Greek sovereign debt would need to be restructured. 
Indeed, despite the country already enjoys generous terms on the debt it owes Europe and 
other international creditors, without further debt relief, it seems, however, unlikely that the 
latter will be able to return to health and avoid defaulting on its obligations. 
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The Greek economy greatly deteriorated over the last months. GDP fell by around 3% in 
2015; in addition, Greece will be expected to achieve a lower than forecasted surplus for 2016 
and 2017 on its budgets, before debt payments. [TAYLOR, C. (2015)] Moreover, the banking 
system was badly damaged. The deterioration in the economic conditions caused the bank 
balance sheets to be weighed down with bad loans. This meant that banks needed new capital. 
Thus, much of the initial major tranche of financial aids released to Greece by international 
lenders has been used for the recapitalization of its banks, as well as paying the Greek state’s 
bills. Finally, capital controls asphyxiated the already-weakened economy.  
Therefore, in this framework, what might a debt restructuring look like? 
A starting point could be that of reducing Greece’s future debt servicing costs. This goal 
could be achieved through the implementation of a plan consisting in the combined adoption 
of three debt relief measures. 
Firstly, a reduction in the interest rate charged by the Greek Loan Facility, which is currently 
equals to three-months Euribor plus 50 basis point. A reduction of the spread over the Euribor 
from 50 basis point to 0 would, indeed, allow Greece to save around €6,4 billion (in net 
present value terms), i.e. 3,4% of 2015 GDP, in gross financial needs over 35 years. The 
second measure would, instead, consist in an extension of the maturity of the loans in the 
Greek Loan Facility by 10 years to 2051 (from 2041 initially); the direct result of this ten-year 
maturity extension would be a decrease in the net present value of interest expenses for the 
Hellenic Republic of 4,5% of the country’s 2015 GDP. Finally, a ten-year extension of the 
maturity of the EFSF loans3, which would enable Greece to obtain a “discount”, in net present 
value terms, of about 8,1% of 2015 GDP. [DARVAS, Z., HUTTL, P. (2015)] 
Thus, summing up, the combined adoption of these three measures would have a net present 
value benefit of 17% of 2015 GDP for Greece, without imposing direct losses on European 
lenders. 
However, it should be pointed out that, despite this reduction in the net present value of 
Greece’s debt servicing costs represents a step in the right direction, it would not be enough to 
put the Greek debt back on a sustainable path; that is why further debt relief measures (for 
instance, those envisaging the use of derivative financial instruments, like debt-to-equity 
swaps or GDP-linked bonds) should be considered. 
3 It should be noticed that the interest rate that Greece pays on EFSF loans is already low (Greece only pays an approximate 1 basis point surcharge over the actual EFSF borrowing cost) and therefore an additional reduction would lead the EFSF to incur into losses. 
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Nevertheless, it is to be noted that some steps have been taken in order to ensure the 
sustainability of Greece’s public debt.  
The €86 billion offered to Greece in the new package will drive Greece's nominal debt-to-
GDP ratio up to 200%, from about 177 % today. But, servicing the replacement debt will 
have a lower cost for Greece. The average interest rate on debt to the EFSF is 1.65 %, while 
that on debt to the IMF is 3.7 %. Moreover, Greece will obtain discounts on outstanding debt, 
as well as in the new aid package. This implies that the country’s interest payments will 
average 3.7 % GDP until 2020, slightly more than what Italy and Portugal pay for servicing 
their debt. [CLINE, W., R. (2015)] 
But, despite the adoption of these measures, the Greek problem seems far to be solved. The 
low output growth will directly affect debt-to-GDP ratio and, thus, accentuate the 
unsustainable nature of the Greek debt. Similarly, continuous fluctuations in the output will 
preclude the possibility that the economy may insure itself; moreover they will affect the 
creditors and the investors’ confidence, making it difficult for the country to regain the access 
to capital market. Finally, the weakness of Greece’s institutions and the lasting climate of 
political uncertainty will lead to problems in the enforcement of the structural reforms, 
reducing the competitiveness of the economy and thereby limiting its ability to service the 
debt.  
 
3.3  A necessary reforms’ program                                                                
As previously outlined, although also Greece’s European lenders agreed that measures 
ensuring the sustainability of the country’s public debt would have to be taken, they has not 
pledged to actually cut its debt mountain. Instead, the latter argue that “debt sustainability can 
be achieved through a far-reaching and credible reform programme and additional debt 
related measures without nominal haircuts”. [WEARDEN, G., FLETCHER, N. (2015)] 
However, if Greece does not return to growth, a debt restructuring will be unavoidable; and, 
since creditors refuse to allow for a write-off of the sovereign debt, the only feasible way to 
achieve a sustainable debt reduction would require to provide the correct stimulus for growth. 
Thus, by learning from past history, it is clear that if Greece wants to achieve a sustainable 
debt reduction, it and its creditors will have to focus on finding the right balance between the 
need to achieve substantial fiscal consolidation, the desire to prevent injustice, and the 
necessity to restore economic growth.   
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Greek consumer demand is that of a developed country, yet its supply side is on par with the 
developing world. [PAPADAVID,  P. (2015)] But if the country lacks of an adequate private 
productive sector, its economic growth will always depend exclusively on consumption. This 
means it will keep being heavily reliant on foreign imports, rather than domestic production, 
to satisfy consumer demand. And to do so, it will have to get into debt. This will entrap the 
county into a vicious cycle of political and economic risk. Conversely, encouraging 
entrepreneurship would improve Greece’s supply side and increase social welfare by 
diversifying the sources of growth and increasing job opportunities. [PAPADAVID, P. 
(2015)] 
All this would firstly require to solve the labour market problem and offset the social 
consequences of the crisis. Therefore, active labour market policies needed to be launched, as 
well as measures aimed at improving social safety net. A properly targeted active labour 
market policy and prompt development of a welfare reforms’ program together with 
improvements in education should help to reduce income inequality, poverty risk and long 
term unemployment. [OECD (2015)] To reach these goals, Greece should also develop 
human resources, increase the investments in education and lifelong earnings. It should also 
take steps to reduce the number of early school-leavers, increase the take-up of apprenticeship 
and lifelong learning and enhance tertiary education. This would help to provide high-skilled 
and well-educated workforce with competences that the economy needs and cushion the 
negative consequences of unforeseen local and sector crisis. 
However, in relation to the implementation of the welfare reforms, it should be noted that 
while most Greek citizens think that the welfare state’s expansion guarantees social justice 
and income equality, Greece’s biggest problem is represented by its public sector, because the 
latter has squeezed private sector enterprise. But, the problem does not lie in the share of 
public employment (that is at 22%), which is around the OECD average, rather in the fact that 
as a share of economic output, at nearly 25%, public administration is too large; Greece’s 
manufacturing sector is, instead, a meagre 8% of the economy. [PAPADAVID, P. (2015)] 
Therefore, further steps must be taken in the product market’s area in order to increase growth 
potential; in particular, the attention must be drawn to product market deregulation. There are 
two important ways in which product market deregulation can influence growth. One is 
abolishing monopolistic and monopsonistic structures and eliminating barriers to entry which 
restrict output and, therefore, total income. A second sense is related to the effects that market 
deregulation may have on TFP (Total Factor Productivity) growth. [IOANNIDES, Y., M. 
(2015)]   In particular, it has been estimated that a progressive (over ten years) convergence to 
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the OECD-wide average share of public enterprises in total value added would increase 
annual TFP productivity growth by about 0,7% in Greece and in other European countries 
that still present a large number of  state-owned businesses. This acceleration would endure as 
long as the process of privatization continues and the economy has not yet reached the new 
steady-state productivity growth path. [NICOLETTI, G., SCARPETTA, S. (2003)] 
In addition, promoting growth and job creation also requires to address the inefficiency 
problems of agriculture, fisheries and energy sectors, which are mostly underdeveloped but 
have an enormous potential for improving the country’s competitiveness. [TERZI, A. (2015)] 
Therefore, investments must be made in the energy sector in order to increase energy 
efficiency in public and residential buildings and in SMEs; this would, in turn, lead to a better 
classification in terms of energy consumption and a decrease of primary energy consumption 
for public buildings. Moreover, investments in renewable energy must be promoted. In this 
way, the country would be able to reduce the cost of energy imports and the current account 
deficits. [IOANNIDES, Y., M. (2015)] 
Finally, as everyone knows, a well-developed transport system is the prerequisite of an 
advanced economy. Thus, investments in transport infrastructure projects should be 
undertaken: an inefficient transport-sector should be turned in an energy-efficient and 
decarbonized one, new metro lines, tram and railway should be constructed while the existing 
railway lines should be upgraded. 
The initiatives and the measures outlined so far should be undertaken in order to promote the 
country’s competitiveness and enhance Greece’s growth potential; but, the country has not the 
money to launch investments that would boost economic growth. Therefore, a starting point 
for Greece could be that of funding these reforms using €35 billion EU funds that will be 
disbursed under the Job and Growth Plan presented by the European Commission on 15 July 
2015. However, in order to ensure that, even in the future, Greece would have the necessary 
resources to support economic development, institutional reforms should be combined with 
fiscal consolidation. In this perspective, fiscal consolidation does not mean further cuts in 
government expenditure, but rather the development of a plan aimed at reducing the 
distortions in public expenditure management, enhancing an efficient allocation of the 
resources and strengthening the tax collection mechanism. 
Indeed, as outlined above, state revenues always deviated from the level that ensures the 
public economics' sustainability. The main causes of that were high tax evasion due to the 
large number of self-employed workers, inefficiencies in the tax collection process but also 
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the public administration’s inertia in dealing with these issues and defining specific 
quantitative targets. Thus, further reforms should be implemented. 
However, in this respect, it is worth pointing out that small steps forward have been made. In 
return for Greece’s third bailout, the Greek government has agreed to increase the corporate 
tax rate from 26% to 29%, and to raise it by an additional percentage point in case of a fiscal 
shortfall. The advance tax payment requirement has been increased from 55% to 100% for 
corporate income and individual business income. The solidarity charge paid by individuals 
has been raised and the VAT system reformed. The standard 23 % rate applies to food, 
energy, water, and other necessities; and a 6% rate applies to books, theater, and 
pharmaceuticals. VAT discounts available on islands have been phased out, while tax 
exemptions applicable to farmers have been eliminated. To increase government revenues, the 
tonnage tax levied on the value of ships under the Greek flag or ships under foreign flags that 
are managed by Greek representative offices has been increased, while tax benefits applicable 
to the shipping industry have been gradually eliminated. [SPRACKLAND, T. (2015)] 
Moreover, additional measures to improve tax collection were agreed between the country 
and its creditors; Greece agreed to introduce a new criminal law on tax evasion, guarantee the 
independence of the revenue agency established in 2012. In addition, tax authorities have 
acquired the right to conduct full scope tax audits for fiscal years that have already been 
subject to private tax audits and the use of electronic payments to achieve collection of 
indirect taxations has been promoted. Finally, the tax leniency scheme, which permits 
outstanding debts to be paid in 100 monthly installments, has been revised to guarantee that 
the regime would not apply in the case in which taxpayers are in the position to settle their 
debts earlier. [SPRACKLAND, T. (2015)] 
 
3.4 The exit of Greece from the European Monetary Union as a possible solution 
to the crisis                                                                                                          
Facing with the unsustainability of its public debt, Greece should, instead, opt for an 
alternative to the implementation of the reform programme imposed by its international 
lenders: the implementation of Grexit. This solution was also proposed by the German 
Finance Minister, Wolfgang Sheauble, who presented a plan that, inter alia, envisaged 
Greece’s suspension from the Euro area for a period of five years, in order to give the country 
time to bring its debt back on a sustainable path. Indeed, as previously stated, the third rescue 
package, despite having allowed Greece to afford the repayment on existing debt, increased 
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the country’s debt mountain. But increasing current debt level to allow the country to meet its 
debt obligations would entrap both Greece and its creditors in a vicious cycle, which could 
ultimately lead to the country’s default. Indeed, in order to repay its huge public debt, the 
Hellenic Republic would have to realize ever larger government budget surpluses; and given 
that Greece’s sovereign debt is 177% of GDP, it follows that, in order to reach a situation in 
which the country’s public debt would be at least sustainable, Greece would have to run, 
according to the IMF's estimates, a budget surplus of at least 4.5% of GDP for the entire 
decade of 2020-2030. However, this would imply additional cuts in public expenditure and 
additional increase in the level of taxation. But, as Greece’s recent experiences show, these 
measures would negatively affect consumption and business activity. As a result of the fall in 
the production the prices of both goods and services would decline, thereby increasing the 
ratio of the debt-to-GDP, which would contract both in real terms (recession) and in nominal 
terms (as a result of a decline in the prices level). The contraction of the GDP would, in turn, 
lead to a reduction in the tax base; consequently, tax revenues would collapse, making it more 
difficult for the Greek government to achieve higher surpluses. In this situation, due to the 
inability to service its debt, Greece would be forced to keep relying on the support provided 
by the Troika, which, however, would grant new loans to the former (therefore, leading to a 
further increase in the already unsustainable sovereign debt), only in exchange for additional 
fiscal adjustment measures. 
Therefore, in which perspective, would Grexit be a solution? In order to answer to this 
question, we need to consider Greece’s past experiences. Indeed, the country’s current 
difficult economic situation could be also attributed to real exchange rate ("competitiveness") 
imbalances within the Euro zone, that Greece can no longer compensate by letting its national 
currency fluctuate. The currency overvaluation that resulted from the substitution of the Euro 
for the drachma could have harmed the competitiveness of the country's export sector. 
[PAPANIKOS, G., T. (2015)] It could have also prompted the Hellenic governments to 
borrow heavily in order to limit the social and political consequences of deflationary shocks 
caused by the imbalanced exchange rate. [DALLAGO, B. (2013)][FELDSTEIN, M. (2012)] 
It is exactly in this perspective that Greece’s withdrawal from the European Monetary Union 
could be considered as a solution. 
However, at this point, a remark must be made. 
Before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, in 2009, the EU Treaties did not contain 
provisions which considered the possibility of a withdrawal of a Member State from the 
European Union or the European Monetary Union. [ATHANASSIOU, P. (2015)] 
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These provisions were deliberately not considered in order to prevent the rise to doubts about 
the commitment of a Member State, and, thus, reduce the risk of moral hazard, preserve the 
credibility of the EU and emphasize the irreversibility of the integration process. 
On the contrary, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced an “exit clause”, which allowed a Member 
State to withdraw from the EU, but the latter does not specifically refer to the withdrawal of a 
Member State from the EMU. With respect to this issue, two hypotheses can be formulated. 
First, the right of a Member State to withdraw from the Euro could be implicit in its right to 
withdraw from the EU Treaties. This implies that the exit of a Member State from the EMU 
does not require a special procedure. The second hypothesis, instead, refers to the possibility 
that the right to exit from the EMU has never been considered. 
However, whatever the interpretation of the non-regulation of the “EMU’s exit right”, the 
absence of a clear and comprehensive regulation, which defines the different stages and 
supports the Member State during the “Euro exit” process, is a source of uncertainty and 
consequent political and economic instability. 
Therefore, in this framework, some questions should be asked: which are the legal and 
economic implications that “Grexit” would have not only in Europe but also worldwide? 
Would leaving the Euro zone be in the best interest of Greece?  
 
3.4.1 The reasons why the Greece should not “abandoned” the Euro 
As indicated above, in theory a Member State may require to leave the Euro without leaving 
the European Union; however the way in which it could be done is not clear. The main 
problem resides in the identification of the institution that has the responsibility to decide 
about the withdraw of a Member State from the Euro zone. Theoretically, the “exit request” 
should be submitted to the European Commission, which is, however, not authorized to 
decide on this issue by any Treaty. [GROTTI, L. (2015)] This makes it clear that a possible 
withdrawal from the Euro zone could have uncertain legal and political consequences and 
undermine the credibility of the project “European Union” and “European Monetary Union”. 
But beyond the political and legal implications, what are the economic reasons supporting the 
permanence of Greece in the Euro zone? 
The first argument to which attention must be drawn on is that Greece should exit from the 
EMU in order to devalue, restore competitiveness and return to growth. 
Looking at the data it is possible to see that, starting from 2007, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain have made important adjustments of the current account of the balance of payments, 
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moving from large deficits into balances or surpluses. However, as outlined in section 1.1, the 
composition of the adjustment has differed among countries. In Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
the most important share of the adjustment has derived from an increase in exports. The three 
countries have succeeded in changing the production structures, recording a significant 
increase in exports; a desirable and healthy adjustment which, inter alia, shows that the 
external adjustment has not been driven by a contraction in the internal demand. This is not 
what has happened in the Greek case. The Greek adjustment was almost entirely driven by a 
contraction of the imports, and only from 2014 onwards, exports have started to record a 
surplus. [IL SOLE 24 ORE (2015)] 
Therefore, what are the causes of such diversity? Are differences in the adjustment mainly 
due to the absence of a real depreciation with respect to the other Eurozone’s countries? Have 
high wages hamper exports? 
The answer is no. In Greece private sector’s hourly wages have recorded a huge drop and, 
with the exception of Latvia and Lithuania, they have become the lowest in the Euro area. On 
the contrary, private sector’s hourly wages have increased in Ireland, Spain and Portugal. By 
comparing the change in exports with that in the private sector’s wages, it becomes clear that 
Greece differs from the other countries. In Greece, in fact, despite significant changes in 
wages, export volumes did not raise as in other countries. [DARVAS, Z. (2015)]  
  
   Fig. 12: Exports, Export demand and REER of Greece 
                                           Source: Bloomberg (2014) 
Therefore, on the basis of the analysis conducted, it is clear that a rapid depreciation would 
not benefit the Greek economy in the way that was hoped for. In fact, the Greek exports’ poor 
performances are mainly due to other factors such as rigid markets and a political system that 
obstructs real changes. [HENNIGAN, M. (2015)] 
Greece’s real problem is not having a strong currency, but rather its low level of productivity; 
thus, devaluing may be not enough to resolve the situation. This does not change even if we 
consider the strengths of the Greek economy: shipping and tourism. Greece has the world’s 
largest merchant fleet, which accounts for 16% of global trade, but it grows quickly in florid 
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times while collapses in periods of recession. In addition, only 21% of ship owners have their 
fiscal headquarter in Greece; and the latter have undoubted fiscal benefits. It follows that the 
impact on the country’s economy would be minimal and changing things would only lead to a 
run to locations with more favorable tax treatments. 
With reference to tourism, it can be observed that whilst it is a growing industry, the quality 
of services provided has deteriorated year after year. Greece does not compete with Spain, 
while it is more competitive than Turkey. However, if it competes with Turkey, which has the 
advantage of not being a member of the Euro zone, it will face the risk to transform its offer 
in poor quality mass tourism. 
Moreover, it must be taken into account that the social tensions, which would arise after the 
return to the drachma, could cause an overall decrease in arrivals. [WOLFF, G., B. (2015)] 
Furthermore, the exit from the European Monetary Union would imply the exit from the 
Single Market. Greece would then need to rebuild trade relationships with the rest of the 
world and, thus, it could face the risk of being isolated. Greece is not a rich country and it 
does not have raw materials: therefore, the repercussions on the economy and people's living 
standards would be serious. Inflation could rapidly rise, the purchasing power of citizens 
would be drastically reduced and poverty would increase. [WOLFF, G., B. (2015)] 
However, the described scenario is even worse if we consider the implications that the 
withdrawal of Greece from the Euro area would have on the banking and financial sector. A 
high financial instability accompanied by a possible nationalization of banks would be the 
first consequence of Grexit. Indeed, a restart of the banking system would be needed, if only 
to ensure trade in essential goods and services. A huge systemic bank resolution would be 
necessary. The sequestration of the collateral would deplete the banks’ assets, and the 
remaining assets would likely have lost the most of their value. [WSJ (2015)] In the process 
of resolution, the banks would need to be recapitalized and this recapitalization could be 
realized through the use of public funds, or in other words through the nationalization of the 
banks. In addition, the imposition of strict capital controls, the closure of access to the capital 
market for the government, financial institutions and businesses, and the inability of the latter 
to borrow from the private sector for an unspecified number of years are some of the 
problems that would arise in the event of a withdrawal of Greece from the EMU. 
Finally, what would be Grexit’s cost to the European Union? 
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3.4.2 The contagion risk 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers highlighted that the financial integration achieved at the 
international level has made it difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the systemic effects of a 
decisions taken at the level of individual institutions. In a world where financial markets are 
increasingly interdependent, a decision that determines the fate of an institution can affect the 
investment and financing decisions of many operators, transmitting its effects also to 
activities which are formally considered distant. This is what is meant by risk of contagion. 
Therefore, given the obvious interdependence between European markets and systems what 
would be the effects that the Greek withdrawal from the EMU would have on the project 
“European Union” and the economies of the Member States ? 
Grexit, followed by a possible default, could have direct and indirect effects on the economies 
of other Euro zone Members. In order to evaluate the direct effects of “Greece’s exit”, it is 
necessary to construct a measure of the risk of contagion of the sovereign bond yields of other 
Member States and, particularly, Italy, Spain, Portugal and France, resulting from tensions 
related to Greek government bonds. The historical pattern of the contagion index is shown in 
Figure 13. By construction, this index may be in the range -1 to 1: the higher its value, the 
higher the degree of contagion. 
 
     Fig.13: “Contagious Effect” 
      Source: Datastream(2015) 
The red line indicates the correlation coefficients between the first principal component 
extracted from the daily changes in the spreads, calculated with respect to the German ten-
year government bond yields, in the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Irish and French 
government’s ten-year bonds and the changes in the spreads in Greek government’s ten-year 
bond. The first principal component explains about 65% of the common movements in the 
spreads of the countries considered. The vertical dotted lines represent, respectively, the first 
two Greece’s bailouts and the ECB’s announcement of the Quantitative Easing programme. 
[BORRI, N., DI VAIO, G. (2015)] 
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The idea behind the contagion index is that after Greece’s withdraw from the Euro zone, in 
order to counteract the risk of a Member State’s withdrawing from the Euro area, investors 
will demand an extra premium on the rate of return on government bonds issued by the 
remaining Member States of the EMU. This premium will be all the higher the higher the risk 
that the Member State would leave the Euro zone; in other words, the premium charged will 
be higher for the economically weaker countries and the countries with a high debt-to-GDP 
ratio. 
As figure 13 shows, during the first phase of the Greek crisis, in the spring of 2010, the 
correlation between the spreads of the ten-year government bonds of the Euro zone countries 
was high. However, the bailout of May 2010, the ECB's LTROs at the end of 2011 and the 
bailout of February 2012 have greatly reduced the risk of contagion in the EU Member States, 
like it is possible to see from the drastic fall in the index. As a result, during the last phase of 
the Greek crisis, which started in late 2014, despite the great increase in tensions within the 
Euro zone, the contagion risk appears to have almost halved compared to the first phase of the 
Greek crisis; this was also due to the fact that the tensions in Euro area government bond 
markets were successfully contained thanks to the Quantitative Easing programme launched 
in January 2015 by the ECB. [BORRI, N., DI VAIO, G. (2015)] 
Moreover, it should be noticed that Grexit would have a limited impact on the banking sector 
because its exposure to “Greece-risk” has significantly decreased since 2010. It is, thus, in this 
perspective that the results achieved by the Troika can be considered as more than pleasing; in 
fact, the various measures taken by international creditors under the “process of Greece’s 
public debt management”, have made it possible to completely transfer “Greece-risk” from 
the banking system to the Euro zone governments. 
While at the beginning of 2008, the international banking system (excluding Greece’s banking 
system) was exposed to “Greece-risk” for about €206 billion, such exposure amounted to only  
€120 billion at the end of 2010. In those two years, there was a rapid reduction in the amount 
of Greece’s debt held by foreign investors, while the new public debt issues were almost fully 
subscribed by the national banking system. Moreover, between 2010 and 2011, the total 
amount of  Greece’s public debt held by the national banking system kept growing, reaching 
the value of €350 billion (about 60% of  Greece’s total debt) in February 2012; Meanwhile 
foreign investors reduced their exposures by more than 30%, below €80 billion. This 
reduction was mainly due to the Greek government bonds’ sales that occurred in the 
secondary market. In addition, over the same period, a transfer of  “Greece-risk” from the 
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private to the public sector took place as a result of the provision of the bilateral Euro zone 
member-states loans to Greece (the Greek Loan Facility). [MINENNA, M. (2015)] 
In February 2012, a massive debt restructuring programme was launched, together with the 
second bailout package. The restructuring programme did not involve Greece’s public debt 
held by international investors (IMF, ECB and Euro zone governments); on the contrary, as 
mentioned above, it resulted in a 53,5% reduction in the face value of the Greek government 
bonds held by the private sector. Much of the burden of this reduction was borne by the 
Hellenic banking system, which has suffered losses of €40 billion. 
This date is important also because it represents a structural turning point in the process of 
management of risks related to the country’s public debt, since the “entrance” of the EFSF 
corresponded to the “net fading” of private investors (both foreign and domestic), whose 
exposures to “Greece-risk”, between 2012 and 2014, were reduced by more than 80%. 
Meanwhile the share of government debt held by the public sector grew, amounting to almost 
80% of the Greece’s total debt in 2014. This was due to the fact that, after the start of the 
second economic adjustment programme, the new public debt issued by the Hellenic 
government was almost fully subscribed by the EFSF. 
Thus, as a result of this process, in 2015, the structure of the Greek public debt appears to 
have been significantly changed, with the “partial extinction” of private investors (whose 
exposures to Greece amounted to €47,4 billion) and the massive presence of supranational 
institutions (which hold around 80% of the country’s total debt). 
 
                Fig. 14: Greek Public Debt: decomposition by asset class 
                    Source: European Commission (2015) 
Finally, after the launch of the third bailout package in August 2015, the banking system’s 
exposures to “Greece-risk” was even more reduced. Indeed, the Greek banking system holds 
only 4% of the country’s total debt, while foreign banks hold only 1% of the latter. Thus, it 
seems clear that nowadays Grexit, followed by a possible default, would not damage the 
European banking system, but rather European Member States that hold more than €200 
billion of Greece’s debt. 
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However, at this point, there is one last thing that should be specified: Grexit would not 
necessarily imply a withdrawal from the Target 2 (the system  for central bank settlements 
within the Eurosystem). In fact, already five central banks of non-Euro area countries 
(Bulgaria , Denmark , Lithuania , Poland and Romania) participate in this payment system, 
provided that they would never be in a debt position. Considering this issue is important as, in 
2015, the Bank of Greece’s liability to the rest of the Eurosystem via Target 2 amounted to 
€114 billion (around 64% of GDP). [EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2015)] This high 
amount owed by the Greek central bank to the ECB is due to the Greek banking system’s 
strong reliance on Emergency Liquidity Assistance; Indeed, as previously stated, the Hellenic 
banks have buffered deposit outflows with emergency funds (ELA) provided by the Bank of 
Greece, that has, in turn, borrowed from the Eurosystem via Target 2. 
Therefore, two possible scenarios lie ahead for Greece in case of Grexit: leaving the Euro but 
remaining in the Target 2 payment system or leaving the Euro and the Target 2. 
In the first case, it is likely that Grexit would not have adverse repercussions on the Target 2 
payment system, since in order to continue to participate in Target 2, Greece would 
immediately pay back the debt (which would be still denominated in Euros) to the 
Eurosystem; but this is a very unlikely situation. [EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2015)]  
On the contrary, if Greece’s departure from the Euro zone led to Greece’s withdrawal from 
the Eurosystem, the Bank of Greece, no longer being able to issue Euros to repay the 
outstanding debt, would be forced to default on its Target 2 obligations. But, Target 2 
liabilities are not collateralized; therefore, in this latter case, there would not be underlying 
assets against which the ECB could have a claim. [WHITTAKER, J. (2016)] This would 
affect ECB’s balance sheet, leading the latter to record a loss. And it is extremely likely that 
remaining Member States would be required to participate in the ECB’s recapitalization since 
any Target 2 losses must be shared by the central banks of the Euro zone according to their 
capital share. [DOR, E. (2015)]  
Hence, contagion could become a major problem again because the non-payment of the debts 
to Target 2 system by the Greek Central Bank would lead to the raise of a potential risk also 
on the debt of Portugal, France, Italy and Spain; more generally, a potential risk would arise 
on each Euro zone member that has a debt to the Target 2. [DURDEN, T. (2015)]  
In this framework, every Euro area countries would have an interest in ensuring that control 
mechanisms and conditions would be imposed on the Eurosystem’s exposure to a Member 
State’s default risk. However, this would give raise to a conflict of interest between the next 
country that would experience massive capital outflows and therefore try to secure sufficient 
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resources to refinance its banking system, and all other Member States, whose aim would be 
limiting the costs caused by the country’s default on its Target 2 obligations. A conflict of 
interest similar to the one that showed the fragility of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
in the early 1990s. [LENZI, F. (2015)] 
That is why, considering the “strengthens” with which some members of the European 
governance supported the hypothesis of Greece’s withdrawal from the EMU, it is worth 
remembering what Draghi said in Helsinki:“The euro is – and has to be – irrevocable in all its 
member states, not just because the Treaties say so, but because without this there cannot be a 
truly single money”. [DRAGHI, M. (2015)] 
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Conclusions 
Greece’s sovereign debt crisis is in its 8th year, but there are no big improvements on the 
horizon. Although it is true that the year 2015 differs significantly from the year 2012 because 
the behavior of the markets is different, fundamentals are different and the risk of contagion is 
relatively low, Greece is still facing a deep economic, political and social crisis from which it 
struggles to emerge. Indeed, despite the recent improvements recorded on the fiscal front, 
economic growth is still missing and the unemployment rate has exceeded 25% causing major 
social tensions.  
Furthermore, the country has recently obtained a third round of financial aid from European 
lenders, that, although having enabled the first to meet is upcoming debt payments, has led to 
a further rise in its, already highly unsustainable, public debt level. 
Therefore, Greece is at a crucial juncture; and three options lie ahead for it, none of which 
could be implemented without sacrifice. 
The first concerns Greece’s withdrawal from the European Monetary Union, i.e. “Grexit”. 
A first beneficial effect of such an option would consist in the fact that an exit from the 
European Monetary Union, followed by a return to the national currency, could lead to an 
increase in the country’s exports, thereby, stimulating growth; but, as it has been previously 
highlighted, it would not be enough to lead the country out of the recession. It might, 
however, be argued that this would not be the only benefit that would arise as a result of 
Grexit. Indeed the latter would also allow to break the vicious cycle of financial assistance to 
Greece. Moreover, if Grexit was accompanied by debt relief measures, it could grant the 
government more flexibility in implementing its fiscal policy.  
But then this would beg numerous questions; firstly, how, on the technical side, could Grexit 
be implemented? And, moreover, would the Greek government be able to limit the extremely 
disruptive effects on the country’s economy that would arise in the short-term? Or could 
Greece’s government contain the inflationary tendencies that would result from the return to 
the national currency? And what would be its impact on the credibility of both the “EMU” 
and the entire “European Union” project? 
The second option, instead, looks to Greece as still Euro zone member. This is an appealing 
option as it would allow to prevent the devastating short-term effects that Grexit could have 
on both the country’s banking, financial and economic sector and the Euro zone as whole. 
However, it would also require the Hellenic government to carry out reforms to achieve 
substantial fiscal consolidation and increase the competitiveness of its economy. But, given 
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that similar programs over past years have not resolved the crisis, could be the new ones more 
successful in achieving this goal? 
Therefore, all this leads to turn the attention on the last option, i.e. Greece keeps being a 
member of the Euro zone, but with a greater flexibility, understood in “debt relief terms”, 
granted to the Hellenic government. This option is interesting because it would not only 
prevent the negative impacts of Grexit, but it would also allow the country to deal with its 
huge debt’s problem and address the structural weaknesses of its economy. Indeed, debt relief 
measures would provide the country a greater room to implement policies, that could help to 
restore economic growth and investors’ confidence; and if debt relief were even conditional to 
the implementation of economic reforms, it could also provide the right motivation for 
addressing the country’s structural inefficiencies. However, the implementation of this latter 
option would not occur in a “certainty’s framework”. Indeed, it is likely that a Greek debt 
restructuring would lead both the other Euro zone governments and private investors to 
experience losses on their loans to Greece; and since, from 1 January 2016 onwards, the new 
discipline concerning banking sector’s rescuing, i.e. the EU’s Bank Recovery Resolution 
Directive (BRRD), has come into effect, a debt restructuring could create uncertainty because 
it is not clear how, in such a case, individual investors would be protected. Not to mention 
that a debt restructuring could lead to the rise “moral hazard” within the Euro area. 
However, whichever option would be adopted, crises are opportunities. Therefore, Greece 
and, more generally, the European Union as a whole cannot afford to miss this chance to learn 
from past experiences and deliver substantial changes in order to avoid that situations, similar 
to that experienced by Greece, would arise in the future. 
In this perspective, a “plan” of transition and transformation of the European governance and 
structuring should be completed as soon as possible. This could be done: by developing 
further fiscal, political, financial and banking integration processes; by promoting better fiscal 
solidarity mechanisms, an increase of European labour mobility, a greater integration and 
harmonization of rules on the protection of bank deposits, unemployment benefits and 
minimum income and a greater harmonization of economic and fiscal policies that encourage 
investments and growth. 
Finally, it is also necessary to promote a better harmonization of the European financial, 
banking and fiscal rules and an increased integration of the European governance. This latter 
should even “include” the ECB acting as lender of last resort in the government bond markets 
of the monetary union and an European fiscal backstop that would make it possible to 
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manage, in a timely and expedient fashion, critical situations before the latter turn into 
systemic crisis, seeking, at the same time, to reduce incentives to “moral hazard”. 
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